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Abstract
This paper studies the relationship between commodity markets in two key regions of the inter-
national economy during the 1469-1914 period: the Ottoman Empire and Europe. By providing
evidence on what thus far has been largely a qualitative discussion, we propose the first compre-
hensive empirical analysis of the process of market integration between Istanbul and 19 European
cities, using data on commodity baskets and a set of traded goods. By computing dynamic factor
models using Bayesian inference we are able to overcome a series of data constraints, such as
missing observations and small sample size. The results point to the existence of broad and per-
sistent market linkages between the two regions throughout four and half centuries. We also find
that market integration was negatively impacted by the intensity of Ottoman-European conflicts.
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1 Motivation
Europe and the Islamic world constituted two largely separate urban systems, each with a different
structure and long-term evolution and with little evidence of significant interaction across religious
lines.
Bosker et al. (2012, p.1419)
What makes the Ottomans important from the perspective of European history is that the empire
steadily looked westward for expansion [. . . ] This is precisely why the Ottomans mattered to Europe’s
internal developments.
Iyigun (2008, pp.1470-1)
Economic historians have long been engaged in scholarly debates about the origin and evo-
lution of commodity market integration and its implications for economic development. This is
because understanding the level of connectedness of global and regional markets allows to gain an
understanding on market efficiency, embodied in how quickly price signals are transmitted across
borders, and thus to assess the quality of market institutions of allocative efficiency. A recent
survey by Federico (2012) provides a comprehensive summary of the literature investigating how
market integration evolved over time and across space. Federico (2012) highlights, iter alia, our
limited knowledge about long-run integration beyond Western Europe and the US, as well as on
the period preceding the nineteenth century. This paper aims to bring some new insights on the
topic by undertaking an analysis of commodity market integration between two key regions of the
international economy, the Ottoman Empire and Europe, during 1469-1914.
The large body of literature on Ottoman-European economic relations considers the develop-
ments in the two regions’ economic history as deeply entwined and interdependent. Standard
historiography accounts identify economic exchange as a major dimension of interaction between
the two worlds, despite recurrent military confrontations and political rivalries. A recent paper
by Iyigun (2008) provides empirical evidence of the existence of considerable interactions between
Europe and the Ottoman Empire, with the latter having a positive impact on the former’s political
and ecclesiastic history. Specifically, by showing that Ottomans’ military expeditions in Europe
were associated with a lower number of intra-European conflicts, the paper highlights one of the
dimensions in which European history was influenced by its periphery.
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This conventional wisdom has recently been challenged by Bosker et al. (2012), who point
to the absence of interdependence between the Islamic world (including the Ottoman Empire) and
Europe, measured by the lack of integration between Muslim and Christian cities over the 1000-1800
period. Identifying the concept of integration in terms of “urban potential”, the authors find that
the difference in religious denomination between European and Middle Eastern cities represented
a significant barrier between the two regions’ economic integration.1 While being more related
to market access than to conventional integration measures, Bosker et al. (2012) use the urban
potential index in a set of regressions to test for the existence of economic linkages between Europe
and the Islamic world. They interpret the empirical results as evidence of the lack of significant
interactions between the two areas (Bosker et al., 2012, p.1427).
Such different perspective on the evolution of Ottoman-European linkages defies traditional
historical accounts, which portray the two regions as linked by strong economic ties and significant
commercial relations between the fifteenth century and the outbreak of World War One Europe,
thus raising some interesting questions: to what degree were Ottoman and European commodity
markets influenced by each other’s development? How strongly were their markets integrated? Did
the two regions interact predominantly in the political and military sphere but not in the economic
one?
By answering these questions we provide two types of contributions: one empirical, one method-
ological. First, we revisit the ongoing debate on the nature of the linkages between Ottoman and
European worlds, by providing empirical evidence on a specific dimension of their long-run economic
relations: the integration of the two regions’ commodity markets. While the relationship between
European and Ottoman prices has been previously studied by Pamuk (2001, 2004), we are the first
to provide a comprehensive empirical analysis of commodity market integration.2 Specifically we
1Bosker et al. (2012, p.1423) measure the urban potential of a predominantly Muslim (Christian) city as the
distance-weighted sum of the population of all other Muslim (Christian) cities.
2Pamuk’s seminal contributions stem primarily from the collection of Ottoman price data and the construction
of an Ottoman CPI (Pamuk, 2001, 2004). The two papers also present a comparison of price trends in the
Ottoman Empire and Europe by plotting CPI series; a similar approach is provided by O¨zmucur and
Pamuk (2007), with a focus on real wages. Our analysis complements and improves the existing qualitative
literature.
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investigate the dynamics of price transmissions between Istanbul and 19 European cities between
1469 and 1914, using data on CPI and on a set of specific traded goods. Following Federico (2012)
we consider two markets to be integrated if two conditions are satisfied: the law of one price and
market efficiency.3 By computing rigourous estimates of the dynamics of integration using the long
dure´e approach, we are able not only to gain an in-depth understanding of the nature of the histori-
cal relationship between two key regions of the international economy, but also to obtain informative
insights on their process of long-run growth and development. This is because market integration
(or the lack thereof) reflects the existence (absence) of well-functioning institutions of allocative
efficiency.4 Furthermore, analysing the behaviour of commodity markets is indicative not only of
the extent to which the European and the Middle Eastern economies were efficiently linked and of
the degree of market-orientation of the two regions, but it is also crucial for understanding whether
the economic rise of Europe occurred in symbiosis with, or isolation from, one of its closest regional
partner.5 Finally, after computing the degree of Ottoman-European market integration, we use our
estimates to test the extent to which military conflicts impacted the process of commodity price
transmission. As recurrent wars severed the economic ties between the Ottoman and the European
worlds, we assess whether disruptive conflictual confrontations prevented the building of persistent
economic relations.
Secondly, we offer a robust methodological solution to a common problem in the measurement
of market integration involving datasets with a long time dimension coupled with missing and/or
limited overlapping observations across series. Specifically, we propose a dynamic factor model
drawing on Beveridge-Nelson decomposition (Beveridge and Nelson, 1981), using Bayesian inference.
3The law of one price implies that two distinct markets should exhibit the same equilibrium price when
integrated. The market efficiency condition refers to the speed of convergence to equilibrium between two
markets after a price shock.
4Integrated markets are associated with good institutions, able to allocate resources efficiently; such institu-
tions are in turn considered among the key factors contributing to the creation of the set of incentives which
eventually led to the industrial revolution North and Thomas (1973); North (1981).
5One of the enduring controversies in economic history is centred around the degree to which Europe’s
relationship with the rest of the world was significant in her breakthrough as dominant industrial economic
power (Findlay and O’Rourke, 2007, pp.330-1).
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In this setting, the long run equilibrium between two series is captured by a stochastic trend and,
at the same time, each series is allowed to follow its own stationary process, embodying individual
dynamics. This method enables us to deal with two key challenges. First, consistent with Bayesian
estimation, we handle missing data as parameters, rather than imputing them or truncating the
sample, thus handling unobserved individual prices in a realistic and flexible manner.6 This is
particularly important because our analysis uses price data, which are by nature not predictable;
hence imputing missing observations by interpolation may seriously distort the behaviour of the
series, while using only contiguous observations would lead to the loss of useful information, to
the point of undermining the feasibility of the study. Secondly, in order to assess the existence of
market integration, instead of testing the null of no co-integration against the alternative (as for
example in the Johansen co-integration test), we simultaneously draw inference on three hypotheses:
no integration, weak market integration and strong market integration by comparing the posterior
probabilities of each model. This strategy provides more robust results compared with standard co-
integration approaches which, despite asymptotic validity, may generate conflicting inference when
the null and alternative hypotheses are switched, even more so in a small sample setting.
The paper is structured as follows: after providing an overview of Ottoman-European economic
linkages (section 2), we describe the data (section 3) and the econometric methodology used to test
for market integration (section 4). We then present and discuss the results (sections 5-6) and assess
the impact of conflict on integration (section 7). Section 8 concludes.
2 The development of Ottoman-European economic relations
How strong were the linkages between Ottoman and European markets? How did the degree
of integration between them evolve and respond to the economic and political changes shaping
over 400 years of history of bilateral commercial relations? We start by offering some background
information about the evolution of the economic linkages between Europe and the Ottoman Empire,
which will help the reader assess the existence of commodity market integration (or lack thereof)
between the two regions. Specifically, we focus on the intensity, composition and geographical
spread of bilateral commercial relations, as well as on the available evidence on price movements,
6Bayesian methods are increasingly been adopted in empirical analysis; see for instance Uebele (2011); Moral-
Benito (2012).
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which are of key importance to gain insights on the process of price transmission. To be clear,
the existence of trade between two countries is a necessary but not sufficient condition for market
integration to occur. This is because a change in a country’s volume of trade, led by shifts in import
demand or export supply, could be driven by a wide variety of factors, such as an expansion in the
land frontier, population growth, etc. . . , which are not necessarily related with commodity market
integration. Thus, in order to be able to offer robust evidence on market integration, we need to look
at the change in the dispersion of commodity prices between locations: that is, the degree of price
convergence, which signals that trade-creating forces have an impact domestic commodity prices.7
In what follows we illustrate the evidence provided by the literature so far on Ottoman-European
price movements.
Exhaustive accounts of the histories of the Middle East and Europe have documented the evolv-
ing nature of the economic linkages between the Ottoman Empire and Europe (see among others,
Braudel, 1995; Inalcik and Quataert, 1994; Langer, 1935; Pamuk, 1987). These were initially shaped
by Ottoman political and military dominance, beginning with the conquest of Istanbul (1453) which
gave the Empire an unparalleled strategic base to dominate the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.
Mehmet the Conqueror’s navy was able to overturn Venice’s supremacy in the Eastern Mediter-
ranean at the end of the fifteenth century, thus making Istanbul one of the largest transit centre
of the south-north trade artery between the Black Sea and Danubian ports and the main cities of
the Eastern Mediterranean, Arabia and India (Cleveland, 2004, p.40). The Empire’s presence in
the Continent via its territorial expansion in Eastern Europe, reaching the doors of Vienna, and its
control of the Balkans reduced the geographic distance between the two regions. This made of Is-
tanbul, the Empire’s capital, a powerful economic, political and cultural center; due to its strategic
location it was also the principal Ottoman market competing with Europe.8
The strength of the commercial and economic relations between Europe and the Ottoman Em-
pire varied throughout the centuries. They were impacted by the evolution in the geographic
7Changes in commodity prices in turn lead to a redistribution of resources between economic activities. See
O’Rourke and Williamson (2002) for a detailed explanation about the role of prices in measuring commodity
market integration.
8For example, Inalcik and Quataert (1994, p.182) document the competition between Venice and Istanbul
over grain supplies.
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location and distribution of bilateral commercial networks, mirroring the decline of the Mediter-
ranean and the rise of the Atlantic as the fulcrum of global trade. A key turning point was the
signing of the Treaty of Karlowitz (1699), marking the end of the Empire’s territorial expansion
and a decline in its political strength. Also its economic structure and trade patterns underwent
considerable changes: Ottoman raw materials, normally channeled for internal consumption and
industry, started being exchanged, at an increasing rate, for European manufactured products.9
Moreover, from the 1800s the technological advances brought about by the industrial revolution,
which led inter alia to a considerable expansion of road, canal and rail networks, as well as to
unprecedented reductions in bilateral transportation costs, led to an intensification of the economic
interactions. These were coupled by variations over time in the composition and patterns of trade
between the two regions, reflecting comparative advantage and specialisation, as the Ottoman Em-
pire transformed from being self-sufficient in manufacturing at the beginning of our data period to
a net importer of manufactured goods and an exporter of raw materials by the end of it.
The absence of consistent statistics of trade flows between the Ottoman Empire and Europe does
not allow to have a complete picture of the dynamics of commercial exchange. However available
studies, most of qualitative nature, document the development of significant trade relations between
the fifteenth century and the outbreak of World War One, suggesting the existence of interconnected
markets (see for example Berov (1974) and Barkan (1975)).10
The historical literature also offers insights about price movements between Europe and the Em-
pire: Berov (1974) suggests that average Ottoman price levels, in silver terms, were comparable to
those in Italy, France, England and the Netherlands. Barkan (1975) and Braudel (1995, pp.517-542)
argue that the transmission of the wave of inflation from Europe to the Ottoman territory during the
9 Furthermore, European merchants started playing an increasingly important role in Ottoman commerce.
Their penetration in the Ottoman economic sphere was sanctioned by a system of privileges established by
a series of commercial treaties, known as Capitulation. The first, negotiated with France, allowed French
merchants to be exempt from Ottoman taxes, to import and export goods at low tariff rates and to be under
the legal jurisdiction of the French consul in Istanbul.
10Barkan (1975) writes extensively about the high level of interdependence between economic and political
spheres in Europe and the Near East, associating the decline of the Ottoman Empire with the disruption
of its traditional trade routes in the Mediterranean and the related rise of the Atlantic economy.
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sixteenth century, due to the large specie inflows from the New World, led to considerable increases
in the price level of basic commodities also in the Empire. Thus a large proportion of goods like
wheat and other grains, copper and wool, were diverted from the domestic to the European market,
leading in turn to shortages and higher prices at home (Barkan, 1975).11 The increase in commer-
cialisation and monetisation of the Ottoman realm, together with the transmission of inflation from
Europe, are held as contributing factors to the average price hike throughout the Empire. Pamuk
(2001, p.81) further considers the high level of development in maritime transportation and the
sophistication of commercial network in the Mediterranean as signs of the interconnection between
Europe and the Empire.
Overall, most of the available literature on the economic relations between Europe and the Em-
pire is of descriptive/qualitative nature. As far as we are aware, only Pamuk (2004) and O¨zmucur
and Pamuk (2007) have examined the behaviour of Ottoman prices and compared them with those
in Europe. By plotting data on CPI and wages in Istanbul and various European locations they
have provided suggestive evidence on the existence of integration between the two regions in the
long-run. However, both authors point to the need of extending their work, by investigating the
process of Ottoman-European integration more in depth, and providing a more comprehensive em-
pirical analysis, thus bringing quantitative evidence on what thus far has been largely a qualitative
discussion. This would not only provide more rigour to their analysis, but would also offer a better
understanding of the variation in the magnitude of integration between the Ottoman and the Eu-
ropean markets over time and space. This paper intends to take up this task. Specifically, drawing
on the co-integration literature we will provide the first empirical analysis of the dynamics of the
process of price transmission between Istanbul and various European cities and of its variation
through four and half centuries.
3 Data
We use two types of data, both with yearly frequency, between 1469 and 1914: CPI and the
prices of a set of traded goods (wheat, rice, butter, olive oil, honey, soap, charcoal, wood and
chickpeas). The Ottoman Empire’s data are from Pamuk’s extensive collection of Istanbul’s prices
(Pamuk, 2000). Istanbul’s CPI, constructed using constant relative weights reflecting consumption
11See also Pamuk (2001).
8
patterns, includes both food and non-food items (flour, rice, cooking oil, honey, mutton, chickpeas,
olive oil, soap, wood, coal, nails).12 The data for the 19 European cities in our sample are from
Allen (2001). The European CPIs are constructed using similar baskets, allowing for differences in
national consumption patterns (for example wheat bread prices are used for Spain, while rye bread
prices for Poland). Like in the Ottoman case they include both food and non-food items (bread,
beans/peas, meat, butter/olive oil, cheese, eggs, beer/wine, soap, linen, candles, lamp oil, fuel).13
To allow comparability all data have been converted into grams of silver.
Prices constitute the most widespread unit of analysis in the market integration literature,
commonly used to test for the Law of One Price. Provided that a good is traded, observing price
trends or price gaps between markets and their change over time allows to make inference about
the degree to which shocks are transmitted across locations. When using the CPI we are interested
in testing for market integration in a broader sense, looking at convergence in the overall price level
between markets. Despite not being identical, all items included in the Ottoman and European
CPIs are highly comparable and representative of the typical consumption basket of an average
income earner.14 Furthermore, the vast majority of the goods used to construct the indices were
traded between the Ottoman Empire and Europe, though not always on a regular basis (O¨zmucur
and Pamuk, 2007, p.60). Thus, while using CPI data allows us to draw a broad brush picture of
the Ottoman-European economic linkages, we also focus on the behaviour of specific markets in
order to measure the intensity of the linkages between some key traded commodities. We see the
two analyses as complementary.
4 Econometric Methodology
There is a rich literature on market integration, both within historical and contemporary settings.
The standard methods used to test for market integration range from the simple computation of
coefficients of variation, to OLS regressions to the use of more advanced econometric techniques
12For details on CPI construction and on the archival sources used see Pamuk (2000).
13For details on the CPIs’ construction method see Allen (2001, pp.420-22).
14The lack of a complete match in the European and Ottoman CPIs may lead us to reject more easily
the hypothesis of market integration as the lack of convergence may be driven by the different basket
composition rather than by the absence of price transmission.
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focusing on co-integration analysis.15 The co-integration approach has often been coupled with the
estimation of error correction models (ECM) and the computation of half-lives.16 An alternative
approach is founded on the study of price co-movement, tested through the computation of dynamic
factor models.17
We draw on this literature and base our analysis on the computation of dynamic factor models
within the state space framework. Specifically, we propose a set of bivariate models to investigate
the relationships between Istanbul and other European cities. This approach allows us to identify
and isolate the interactions between two cities and potentially provides more robust results in an
Occam’s razor sense. As anticipated in sections 2 and 3, we measure market integration in terms
of price convergence, and this is the approach at the basis of our analytical framework.
This framework includes three models. The first is the most general and represents no market
integration. The second one is nested into the first one and referred to as weak market integration.
The third one is nested in the second one and is labelled strong market integration.
Before introducing the models, we define some notations. There are two cities, i = 1, 2. The
data spans from time t = 1, 2, ..., T . The log price of city i at time t is denoted by yit. Missing
observations are denoted as y∗it.
4.1 Univariate Model
We start by studying each log price series within a univariate framework, then we analyse the
connections between two series. If two markets are not integrated, price changes across locations
are not transmitted, or are transmitted very slowly, hence there would not be any relationship
between two univariate models.
Each city’s price series is partitioned into a stochastic trend, a stationary process and a white
noise. This subdivision can be viewed as an application of the Beveridge-Nelson decomposition
15See for example Shiue and Keller (2007) on market integration between China and Western Europe before
the industrial revolution and O¨zmucur and Pamuk (2007) for a study on European commodity market
integration between 1500 and 1800.
16See, for example Getnet et al. (2005); Federico (2007); Brunt and Cannon (2014).
17See Uebele (2011) for an analysis of wheat market integration between European and US cities and Ander-
sson and Ljungberg (2015) for an investigation of grain market integration in Baltic Sea region in the 19th
century.
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(Beveridge and Nelson, 1981). The stochastic trend represents the long-run expectation or a dy-
namic equilibrium state in a market.
The model is illustrated as follows:
yit = αi + βifit + γigit + e
y
it (1)
fit = fi,t−1 + e
f
it (2)
git = φigi,t−1 + e
g
it (3)
for i = 1, 2 with eyit ∼ N(0, σ2i ). For identification purposes we assume that the innovations
efit ∼ N(0, 1) and egit ∼ N(0, 1) have standard normal distributions and that βi > 0 and γi > 0. All
errors (eyit, e
f
it, e
g
it) are independent across time t and city i.
The intercept αi incorporates transaction costs. The stochastic trend fit represents the dynamic
factor with a constant loading βi. It embodies the long-run steady state implied by aggregate
economic information. We assume that it follows a random walk process. git is a stationary AR(1)
process with φi ∈ (0, 1) and loading γi. It represents city-specific fluctuations related to business
cycles or other short-run price changes around βifit. The white noise error term e
y
it is associated
with measurement error.
The univariate model treats each city separately. If two markets are not integrated they do not
have a common ft or βi: their log price series dynamics are in line with the prediction from the
univariate model.
4.2 Weak Model
When two series share the same stochastic trend ft but have different loading coefficients βt, their
relationship can be modelled as an ECM. Such approach is commonly used in the market integration
literature based on co-integration analysis (see for example Getnet et al., 2005; Brunt and Cannon,
2014).18
The common stochastic trend embodies the long-run relationship between prices and can be
interpreted as a dynamic equilibrium, as illustrated in the following model f1t = f2t:
18 The absence of a co-integration relationship indicates that each time series has its own stochastic trend,
consistent with the prediction of the univariate model.
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yit = αi + βift + γigit + e
y
it (4)
ft = ft−1 + e
f
t (5)
git = φigi,t−1 + e
g
it (6)
for i = 1, 2. With the exception of ft, this is equivalent to the univariate model. We label this
model as weak model of market integration. It is consistent with an ECM because it preserves a
long-run relationship between two variables. In fact Equation (4) can be rewritten as
β2(y1t − α1)− β1(y2t − α2) = β2γ1g1t − β1γ2g2t + β2ey1t − β1ey2t (7)
Because the right-hand side of the equation is stationary, then the left-hand side of the equation is
also stationary. This ensures that a linear function of y1t and y2t is stationary: such linear relation-
ship represents the long-run equilibrium of the two data series. Any temporary deviation from the
long-run equilibrium would cause the data to stochastically adjust and to return to equilibrium.19
If the data support the weak model against the univariate model, the two markets share the
same stochastic trend and preserve a long-run dynamic equilibrium as in an ECM. However, the
existence of such long-run dynamic equilibrium may not necessarily conform with the Law of One
Price, as log price levels may still diverge (if β1 6= β2). The left panel of Figure 1 shows two
simulated series from a weak model, indicating that it would be inappropriate to conclude that two
markets are integrated.20
4.3 Strong Model
We propose a strong model to represent the market integration hypothesis, whereby two cities
19 This is based on the assumption that βi 6= 0. In our application, as plotting the data clearly shows that
the log price levels have trends, we take such assumption for granted.
20When using levels instead of log price data, a divergence between two series may be interpreted as a change
in transaction costs. However, if in the presence of a long time series as in our case, using levels is not
appropriate due to both the likelihood of finding heteroskedasticity and to the fact that the price dynamics
may not fit any simple linear framework. Hence, unless the time series are short, using log price data is
preferable.
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share both the same stochastic trend and loading coefficients. It is our preferred measure of market
integration, as embodied by price convergence and consistent with the prediction of the Law of One
Price. This can be represented graphically by the simulated data in the right panel of Figure 1.
Structurally, the strong model is nested in the weak model by forcing the stochastic trend loadings
βi to be equal between two cities.
The model is as follows:
yit = αi + βft + γigit + e
y
it (8)
ft = ft−1 + e
f
t (9)
git = φigi,t−1 + e
g
it (10)
for i = 1, 2. With the exception of β, this is equivalent to the weak model. The intercept difference
|α1−α2| represents trading costs. Hence, as in the right panel of Figure 1, a strong model predicts
that two log prices are parallel curves, allowing for temporal deviations and noises. For the strong
model to hold, any deviations originated from individual cities, git or e
y
it, would adjusted back to
zero.21
4.4 Bayesian Estimation
The empirical estimation is based on Bayesian inference. Given the nature of our dataset, the
Bayesian method has several advantages. First of all each price series contains some missing obser-
vations.22 Imputing missing data would not be a feasible strategy, as price movements can not be
predicted. In contrast, the Bayesian approach treats these missing values as probability distribu-
tions in the same way as model parameters, thus allowing to account for uncertainty in imputations.
This is of key importance especially within the state space framework: we argue that it would not
be suitable to draw reliable inference with a non-Bayesian method in the presence of such a non
21O¨zmucur and Pamuk (2007) applied the same idea to a restricted ECM by forcing the slope coefficient
equal to 1. Since the authors used price level data instead of log price data, their approach cannot capture
proportional transaction cost.
22In the original datasets by Pamuk (2000) and Allen (2001) the share of missing observations ranges between
0.22 per cent (CPI in Antwerp) and 91.14 per cent (rice in Krakow). In our estimation we use only the
series with a maximum of 60 per cent missing values.
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negligible amount of missing data.
Second, the number of overlapping observations across series is often not large, thus exposing the
empirical estimation to small sample problems, often encountered when using historical data.23 This
becomes particularly relevant when we divide the full sample into subperiods to analyse the change
in market integration over time. While asymptotic inference is valid theoretically, the minimal
number of observations needed to have robust inference is unclear. As small sample properties are
exact under the Bayesian framework, this type of estimation is preferable in our context. In the
empirical estimation we use only the series with a maximum of 60 per cent non-overlapping values
between two cities. This is calculated as the share of non-overlapping observations over t for each
commodity and each computational period.24
Last but not the least, model selection is not achieved by testing a null hypothesis versus the
alternative, but rather by treating each model symmetrically. As the Bayesian framework treats all
models equally a priori, the posterior probabilities of the three models reflect evidence provided by
the data for or against market integration. Indeed, the application in this paper shows that treating
models symmetrically has different implications.
We estimate the models by using the Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methodologies,
explained in detail in the appendix. Suppose that all parameters including the missing data are
denoted by Ψ. The posterior distribution is a collection of many draws Ψ(i) for i = 1, ...,M , where
M is the number of draws that are used for inference in the MCMC. Simulation consistent statistics
can be computed from the sample {Ψ(i)}Mi=1. For instance, the posterior mean of the factor f is
simply computed as ̂E(f | Y ) = 1M
M∑
i=1
f (i), where Y is the data.
An important application is that when forecasting the density at time t by using information
up to t− 1, we need to obtain the posterior draws Ψ(i) by using data only up to t− 1 to represent
the conditional posterior distribution Ψ | Y1,t−1, where Y1,t−1 = (y1, ..., yt−1) and yt = (y1t, y2t).
If a certain data point yis is missing, we denote yis as an empty element. The predictive density
p(yt | Ψ, Y1,t−1) conditional on the parameter Ψ can be computed easily because the model is
explicit.
23We define overlapping observations as the case in which for both cities have price data for time t
24Therefore, by construction, each univariate series can have a maximum of 60 per cent missing values.
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For the univariate model, we can derive from Equation (1)-(3) that
yt | Ψ, Y1,t−1 ∼ N

α1 + β1f1,t−1 + γ1φ1g1,t−1
α2 + β2f2,t−1 + γ2φ2g2,t−1
 ,
σ2 + β21 + γ21 0
0 σ2 + β22 + γ
2
2


For the weak model, we can derive from Equation (4)-(6) that
yt | Ψ, Y1,t−1 ∼ N

α1 + β1ft−1 + γ1φ1g1,t−1
α2 + β2ft−1 + γ2φ2g2,t−1
 ,
σ2 + β21 + γ21 β1β2
β1β2 σ
2 + β22 + γ
2
2


For the strong model, we can derive from Equation (8)-(10) that
yt | Ψ, Y1,t−1 ∼ N

α1 + βft−1 + γ1φ1g1,t−1
α2 + βft−1 + γ2φ2g2,t−1
 ,
σ2 + β2 + γ21 β2
β2 σ2 + β2 + γ22


The conditional predictive density p(yt | Ψ, Y1,t−1) for different models can be inferred from the
above distributions. Then we can integrate out the parameter estimation uncertainty by taking the
sample average to obtain
̂p(yt | Y1,t−1) = 1
M
M∑
i=1
p(yt | Ψ(i), Y1,t−1) (11)
When we use the data, the value of ̂p(yt | Y1,t−1) is called the predictive likelihood. As the con-
ditional posterior sample Ψ(i) is inferred from the subsample Y1,t−1, the predictive likelihood is a
forecasting-based measure of model fitting.
4.5 Measurement of Market Integration
We report the posterior probabilities of models as a coherent measure of market integration. For
each pair of cities, among which Istanbul is always included, the prior probabilities of the univariate,
weak and strong model are the same. We denote Mi as model i, where i = {uni, weak, strong},
and the prior probability is expressed as
P (Muni) = P (Mweak) = P (Mstrong) =
1
3
.
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The posterior probability of a model is calculated by applying Bayes rule. For example, (recall
that Y is the data) the posterior probability of the strong model is
P (Mstrong | Y ) = P (Mstrong, Y )
P (Y )
=
P (Mstrong)p(Y |Mstrong)
P (Muni)p(Y |Muni) + P (Mweak)p(Y |Mweak) + P (Mstrong)p(Y |Mstrong)
=
p(Y |Mstrong)
p(Y |Muni) + p(Y |Mweak) + p(Y |Mstrong) .
The last equation embodies the principle of equality across the three models’ prior probabilities.
Thus, the interpretation of a posterior model probability is intuitive. For instance, if P (Mstrong |
Y ) = 0.9, we can say that after observing the data, the probability of two markets being integrated
is 90%.
The data density for each model i, p(Y | Mi), is called the marginal likelihood (Kass and
Raftery, 1995). It is a density forecasting based measure for Bayesian model selection. To be clear,
suppose that the data Y = (y1, y2, ..., yT ) is a time series data as in our application, the marginal
likelihood of model Mi can be decomposed as
p(Y |Mi) =
T∏
t=1
p(yt | Y1,t−1,Mi),
where p(yt | Y1,t−1,Mi) is the predictive likelihood of model Mi at time t. When t = 1, Y1,t−1 is an
empty set and the density forecasting are performed on the prior distribution. Such decomposition
shows that the marginal likelihood is an out-of-sample forecasting measure, hence ensuring the con-
sistent comparability of models with different number of parameters. An over-parameterised model
will be automatically excluded if it does not have a good out-of-sample performance. Observing
a comparatively larger marginal likelihood implies that the model receives more support from the
data. Because we assume that all models are equally probable in the prior, the posterior probability
solely reflects the data evidence.
To explain our methodological choices to readers who are not familiar with Bayesian inference,
we provide an ad hoc example to clarify its difference with a classical testing approach.25 Suppose
25 The Bayesian and classical method have fundamental differences on inference philosophy. However, in
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that we test the null hypothesis H0 of observing the weak model Mweak against the alternative H1 of
observing the univariate model Muni, choosing 5% as the significance level to reject the null. While
according to this rule the weak model shall be discarded if its probability is below 5%, conflicting
conclusions may be reached if the null and alternative hypothesis are switched. For instance, if a
hypothesis has probability 30% and the other has probability 70%, neither of them can be rejected.
In this paper, we utilise the posterior probabilities of models as statistical guidance for inference
on market integration. A higher probability of a strong model means that the data support market
integration. A higher probability of a weak model indicates that two markets have a certain long-
run relationship but do not obey to the law of one price. A higher probability of a univariate
model shows that two markets are independent. Instead of specifying a rejection rule, this method
provides a full picture of data evidence for each model. It treats models symmetrically and has no
inferential conflict.
4.6 Half-lives
In all our models the city-specific fluctuations git has a stationary AR(1) representation. Hence it
also has a well-defined half-life, calculated as the posterior mean of ln(0.5)/ ln(|φi|). For a city i,
it represents how long it takes to halve the gap between its current price level and the equilibrium
price. Its interpretation is similar to that of an half-life in an ECM, which measures the speed
of convergence, and hence can be interpreted as market efficiency. Half-lives with small values
represent more efficient markets, as they embody a faster speed of price convergence.
Calculating half-lives when the data frequency is annual can be challenging, as normally com-
modity prices do not take years but weeks or months to adjust to equilibrium. This applies also
to our historical setting. Specifically, Taylor (2001) shows that half-life estimates based on yearly
data are upward biased. A parsimonious way to tackle this problem would be to replace the low
frequency data with the high frequency ones, but this is not feasible in our case. Alternatively,
the underlying basis of the yearly data can be corrected using Taylor (2001)’s suggested strategy.
Let Hˆ be the half-life estimates using yearly data and L be the period over which the “averaging”
practice, we could always find some numerical similarities such as a density interval and a confidence
interval. Although they have different interpretations, the results are comparable and usually point to
similar conclusions.
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applies;26 We can compute the true half-life H by solving
Hˆ =
L ln(2)
ln
(
L(1−2−2/H)−21−1/H(1−2−L/H)
2−1/H(1−2−L/H)2
) .
Following the above mechanism, we have adjusted the predictive half-life accordingly, on a
monthly basis.
5 Results
We start by presenting the results on market integration between Istanbul and each European
city for the full period, 1469-1914. Then, in order to investigate the change in the patterns of
integration over time, we split the sample into five sub-periods (the log marginal likelihoods are
reported in Tables A1 to A76). The choice of dividing the data into sub-samples has been guided
by the way in which the CPI has been constructed, in turn motivated by underlying economic and
monetary trends in the Ottoman Empire.27 Such division is in line with Stoianovich’s periodisation
of Ottoman European commercial relations (Stoianovich, 1974, p.62). In each table column 2
indicates the number of overlapping observations between city-pairs; columns 3 to 5 report the log
marginal likelihoods for our three measures of market integration: no integration, weak and strong
integration. A complementary and intuitive way of looking at the results is provided by the posterior
probability of models in Figures 2 to 7. The bars in each figure represent the posterior probability
of observing each model; they also report the number of overlapping to total observations.28 For
conciseness we plot the posterior probabilities only for a selected number of goods, for the full
results see Figures A1-A5 in the Appendix. Because the number of non-overlapping observation
always exceeds 60 percent during the first sub-period (1469-1585), we do not report these results. As
mentioned in the previous section, in order to interpret our findings we use the posterior probabilities
as statistical guidance; while not specifying a strict rejection criterion, we use the following rule of
thumb as indicative of a strong model’s dominance over the others: P (Mstrong|Y ) = 80%. If this
rule is satisfied we consider two markets to be integrated. To be clear, here the results are only able
to identify the existence of market integration (or lack thereof). The degree of market integration
26If the averaging of annual data is achieved over the monthly (weekly) data, then L equals to 12 (52).
27For details see Pamuk (2004, p.468).
28For example in Figure 2 Amsterdam’s CPI has 101 over 105 overlapping observations with Istanbul’s CPI.
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will be discussed in section 5.1.
Generally, our findings favour the strong integration hypothesis for most time periods, and for
a large number of commodities and cities. Hence, overall our analysis provides support to the
existence of broad and persistent market linkages between the Ottoman and European economies
over the centuries, highlighting a long lasting relationship of mutual influence. At the same time,
we observe a degree of heterogeneity along the dimensions of time, geography and commodity types.
First of all, the empirical analysis based on commodity prices offers stronger evidence of price
pass-through, relative to using CPI data. This is not surprising as the CPIs are not constructed
using identical baskets across countries, and intend to capture the transmission of price changes
across markets at the aggregate level. Nevertheless, we still find some support for integration using
CPI data: for example, the full sample findings point to the existence of integrated markets over
the very long run between Istanbul and two important trade partners in the Mediterranean region,
Napoli and Madrid, as well as with Leipzig and Lwow, linked to the Ottoman capital via the
land route (Figure 3). Observing the existence of a process of long-run price transmission with
cities along both commercial routes is indicative of the significance and complementarity of these
alternative ways of exchanging goods between the two regions. The CPI findings also indicate that
the period in which price transmission was most widespread was 1691-1768 (Figure 2): the data
support the existence of market integration, in the strong form, between Istanbul and five cities
lying both on the sea and the land route: Augsburg, Lwow, Munich, Napoli and Northern Italy.
In the precedent (1586-1690) and successive (1769-1843) sub-periods, we observe strong market
integration with Napoli and Madrid, respectively. This reflects the fact that the Mediterranean had
been the most widely used route to exchange goods between the Ottoman Empire and Southern
Europe for centuries. It also signals that trade between Europe and the Levant was able to resist
the opening of the Cape route and even expand at the end of the 16th century (Davis, 1970, p.202).
Similarly, the analysis based on commodity markets offers widespread support to the strong
integration models; in what follows we summarise the results according to historical periods, the
type of commodities traded and location, whereby we divide Europe in four macro-regions. Broadly
speaking, these regions reflect a division along the major trade routes: North-Western Europe
(Amsterdam, Antwerp, London, Paris) linked to Istanbul via the Mediterranean and the Atlantic;
Central Europe (Augsburg, Munich, Leipzig, Strasbourg) and Eastern Europe (Gdansk, Krakow,
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Lwow, Warsaw) connected to the Ottoman Empire via the land route; Southern Europe (Florence,
Milan, Madrid, Northern Italy, Naples, Valencia) trading predominantly via the Mediterranean.29
Focusing on the time dimension, we find that commodity market integration was persistent over
the centuries. The historical phase which witnessed the most widespread economic linkages spanned
from 1586 to 1843 (sub-periods 2 to 4), as during these years the strong integration model is favoured
over the others for most of commodities/cities in the sample. However, we also observe that the
share of integrated cities relative to the non-integrated ones declines over time: from 72 percent in
1586-1690 to 61 percent in 1691-1768 to 59 percent 1769-1843.30 While this share declines further
(to 40 percent) in the last sub-period, 1844-1914, it is important to highlight that for this time
span we have data only for four commodities and two cities, of which 2 are integrated.31 As such,
the results may not necessarily mirror a weakening of the linkages between the Ottoman Empire
and Europe during the second half of the nineteenth century, but may rather reflect the lack of a
comparatively exhaustive sample relative to the earlier periods.
The results on the spatial patterns of integration are summarised in Figure 8. In North-Western
Europe we find evidence of price convergence between 1586 and 1843 for a variety of commodities:
chickpeas, butter, wheat, soap, charcoal, olive oil and wood.32 We find similar patterns in Central
Europe: our results point to the existence of price transmission with Ottoman markets between
1586 and 1843 for a wide set of commodities. We identify the largest number of integrated mar-
kets in Augsburg, Munich and Leipzig during the third sub-period (1691-1768), and in Strasbourg
integration increased in the following sub-period (1769-1843). For the Eastern European cities we
find the largest share of integrated markets in the period from 1586 to 1690.33 Turning to Southern
29Northern Italy is a composite of average prices in Venice, Milan and Florence.
30The shares are calculated as follows: in 1586-1690 we have price data for 25 commodities/cities, of which 18
are integrated with Istanbul. The correspondent numbers for 1691-1768 are 33 over 54; and for 1769-1843
22 over 37.
31Specifically we have data for Milan’s olive oil, rice, soap and wheat markets and Strasbourg’s rice market.
32While in Antwerp the share of integrated markets did not change during this period, for Amsterdam
and Paris the periods with the largest number of linked markets were 1691-1768 and 1769-1843, with
integration increasing over time. All London’s markets for which data are available (butter, wheat, olive
oil) were integrated with Istanbul in the third subperiod (1691-1768).
33This region exhibits some heterogeneity: only Gdansk’s markets were integrated for three consecutive
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Europe, we find clear evidence in support for the strong model in both sub-periods 2 and 3, with
Napoli exhibiting the strongest linkages in the region. At the same time we observe a decline in the
average share of integrated markets in the following century (1691-1843).34
When looking at specific commodities, we find that grains and particularly wheat (Figure 7),
had strong and geographically widespread patterns of integration. Wheat price data are available
for the 1691-1843 period for 13 cities. In 1691-1768 10 of them and in 1769-1843 13 of them are
integrated with the Ottoman capital. In the rice market (Figure 5) price convergence took place
between Augsburg and Istanbul (but not in Milan and Valencia) in 1585-1690, but then spread to
all cities for which we have data between 1769 and 1914 (Milan, Strasbourg and Warsaw). Also
the olive oil market linkages were strong for a wide set of cities, which were all integrated with
Istanbul between 1585 and 1843, with the exception of Milan in the second sub-period (Figure
4). The soap data are less abundant: they start in 1691 and are available only for four cities
(Milan, Amsterdam, Paris, Leipzig), but still exhibit strong integration patterns between 1691 and
1843 (Figure 6). Wood prices cover only the 1691-1768 period (Figure A5), in which the strong
model always dominates the others, in all cities (Augsburg, Gdansk, Madrid, Northern Italy, Paris,
Warsaw). Istanbul’s chickpea markets are integrated with all cities in 1586-1690, but this declines
rapidly in the following periods (Figure A3). Finally, we find less robust evidence for integration in
the butter and charcoal markets (Figures A1, A2).
5.1 Half-lives
The findings presented in section 5 allowed us to understand whether two markets were integrated,
and how this changed over time. In this section we assess the efficiency of integrated markets by
looking at half-lives, indicating how fast price deviations from equilibrium, caused by short-run
shocks, were cleared. Figures 9 to 11 illustrate the half-lives of all integrated commodities between
sub-periods (1586 to 1843), behaving similarly to most Central and North-Western European cities, with
the largest share in 1769-1843. Furthermore, we find evidence of price pass-through between Lwow and
Istanbul’s butter and chickpeas markets in 1586-1690, and for all available Krakow’s markets (chickpeas
and olive oil) between 1586 and 1768. Warsaw’s price data are available only for 1691-1843, during which
the majority of the commodities support the strong integration hypothesis.
34We do not find any evidence of integration in Napoli’s and Northern Italy’s markets in this period.
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1586 and 1843 (see Tables A77-A86 in the appendix for the full results).35 In both figures and
tables, we report two half-lives, representing the speed of convergence to equilibrium of Istanbul’s
prices as well as those of the paired European city. Looking at both half-lives allows us to identify
the leading city within each market, by looking at which location reached faster the equilibrium
path. Thus, observing a quicker speed of adjustment in a specific Istanbul market relative to that
of its European counterpart (that is, if Istanbul had a smaller half-life), is indicative of its higher
efficiency and lower degree of price dispersion.
Overall, the estimates show that the speed of convergence ranged from quickly adjusting mar-
kets, such as Istanbul-Augsburg rice (sub-sample 2) and Napoli-Istanbul wheat (sub-sample 3) to
slower ones, such as Istanbul-Antwerp charcoal (sub-sample 3) and Augsburg-Istanbul wood (sub-
sample 3). Furthermore, the results indicate that the speed of price pass-through was quicker than
one month for 27% of the commodities, it ranged between one and two months for 22% of them,
it was between three and six months for 25% of the markets, while the remaining 27% took more
than 6 months to return to equilibrium. We can also observe that there was not a clear leading
market: Istanbul’s speed of convergence was quicker for 59.1% of the sample (across time and
goods), specifically for wood, butter, olive oil, honey and rice and in sub-samples 2 and 3.36 Finally
on average Istanbul’s half-lives were smaller than those of Valencia, Amsterdam, Napoli, Krakow,
Lwow, Munich, Milano, Augsburg, London, Warsaw and Madrid, but larger than those of Gdansk,
Leipzig, Vienna, Paris, Antwerp and Firenze. Thus, the half-life estimates reinforce our market
integration findings, providing a more detailed picture of the relationship of mutual influence be-
tween European and Ottoman markets. They also suggest that they were both market-oriented
economies, with similarly good institutions of allocative efficiency.37
35We computed also the half-lives of non-integrated markets. As expected, such half-lives have much larger
values relative to those of the integrated ones, reflecting a lower efficiency. While we do not report them,
they are available upon request.
36In the chickpeas and soap markets the speed of convergence was similar between Istanbul and the respective
European city-pair, while the latter had more efficient wheat and charcoal markets. The results from the
full sample point to similar half-lives, while in sub-samples 4 and 5 the European cities had on average a
faster speed of convergence.
37Our finding are in line with those of Shiue and Keller (2007), who compare market integration in China
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5.2 Robustness checks
To verify the validity of our results we perform a set of robustness checks. First we propose an
alternative specification for the city-specific factor git. Following Uebele (2011) we model git as an
AR(8) process (instead of AR(1)) in order to account for potential fluctuations arising from the
business cycle. This strategy is also consistent with Burns and Mitchell (1946), who suggest the
use of 8 lags to adjust for business cycles when using yearly data. All results are reported in the
last three columns of the appendix tables (A1-A76). They are qualitatively similar to our baseline
specification, supporting the strong model from most goods, periods and locations.
Second, we perform the empirical analysis with any number of missing or non-overlapping
observations. Again, all the baseline results continue to hold.38 Finally, we use different thresholds
to accept the dominance of the strong model over the others. Specifically, we choose a stricter
criterion as guideline to consider two markets to be integrated: P (Mstrong|Y ) = 90%. While using
this rule leads to a reduction in the number of integrated commodities, we do not observe any
period- or city-specific pattern. For example, in subsample 2 the goods for which the probability
of the strong model is between 80% and 89% vary from butter in London, Lwow and Napoli to
chickpeas in Antwerp and Krakow to honey in Valencia, thus not involving a particular traded item
or geographic location. In some cases the results are identical, such as CPI and rice in subperiod 2,
chickpeas in subperiod 3 and in the full sample and soap in subperiods 3 and 4. Hence, generally,
using the 90% rule would not change our overall conclusions on integration. Obviously, adopting a
less strict criterion such as P (Mstrong|Y ) = 70% would lead to an even more widespread acceptance
of the strong integration hypothesis.
6 Discussion
Three key findings emerge from our empirical analysis, which can be framed by looking at market
integration along the dimensions of time, geography and commodity types. First, the historical
period in which the strong model of integration was most widely supported by the data stretched
from the seventeenth to mid-nineteenth century. Second, during these two and half centuries we
observe an evolution in the patterns of integration across locations, based on a gradual and partial
and Western Europe and support the argument that both regions had good allocative institutions.
38The results are available on request.
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shift from the dominant role played by Southern and Eastern European markets in their connection
with Istanbul to that of Central and North-Western European markets. Third, we find evidence
of price convergence for most commodities in our sample; this was persistent over time and had a
wide geographic spread especially for the wheat, olive oil and soap markets.
How can we explain such findings? We believe that our results are likely to reflect both the
patterns and intensity of commercial exchange between Europe and Istanbul. Unfortunately, we
are not able to document the volume of trade flows between Europe and the Ottoman Empire, as
aggregate trade statistics are not available for the 1450-1800 period and overall information about
trade transactions of specific commodities and/or years is fragmentary. Instead, we turn to the large
body of historical literature describing the intensity of commercial interconnectedness between the
two regions.39 Most importantly, such literature provides evidence that the commodities in our
sample were import competing, a necessary condition for the transmission of price changes across
locations.40 Berov (1974), among others, reports a list of traded items between the Balkans, the
Empire and Europe between the sixteenth and the nineteenth century, documenting the active
competition between Istanbul and various European cities for basic food items and raw materials.
McGowan (1981, pp.1-3) explains how between the sixteenth and the eighteenth century the patterns
of trade between Europe and the Ottoman Empire mirrored regional specialisation in production,
hence differences in relative factor prices. Europe was able to share cheaper Ottoman factor supplies
during the pre-industrial era of high population growth. Such demographic pressures, particularly
strong in North-Western Europe, altered land to labour ratios (and prices), increasing the need
for unprocessed commodities, usually food and fiber.41 This represented the key linkage in the
Ottoman-European trade, whereby land-intensive Ottoman commodities, were exported in copious
quantities to Europe in exchange for processed goods or coin, following comparative advantage.
39See for example Barkan (1975); C¸izakc¸a (1985); Berov (1974); Wallerstein (1979); Bulut (2001); McGowan
(1981).
40For example, McGowan (1981, pp. 3-5) explains that population pressures in Europe led to an increase in
the demand for primary goods which could not be satisfied by domestic supply, thus leading to an increase
in imports from the Ottoman Empire. See also Stoianovich (1974).
41The conditions of increased population growth in Europe in the sixteenth century meant that there was not
enough land to sustain prevailing consumption patterns, thus leading to a rise in imports from the Levant.
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Indeed, there is extensive evidence that between 1500 and 1800 trade between Europe and the
Ottoman Empire, despite subject to fluctuations, was active and heterogenous, reflecting higher
levels of commercialisation in both regions.42 Trade transactions were regulated by the principle
of capitulation (ahidname) since 1500. This represented a form of amnesty formally granted by
the head of the Islamic community to non-Muslim nations (Inalcik and Quataert, 1994, p.189). In
practice, the capitulations guaranteed foreigners the possibility to travel and trade freely throughout
the Empire and in return the Ottomans expected a similar treatment for their own traders abroad,
that is a quid pro quo bargaining for mutual advantage.43 Another important factor facilitating
trade with Europe was the de facto minimal degree of tariffs and overall protectionist measures
applied by the Empire (Inalcik and Quataert, 1994).
The Ottoman Empire exported to Europe primarily agricultural produce (wheat, rice, olive
oil) and raw materials (silk, wool and mohair) as well as a limited number of manufactures, while
importing mainly cloth and raw materials, such as tin and lead.44 European traders competed with
Ottoman merchant networks for the exports of manufactured goods, especially textiles (Inalcik
and Quataert, 1994, p. 480). The competition for the control of the Mediterranean was quite
lively, even more so the rivalry between English and Venetians merchants in the sixteenth century
and between English, Dutch and French traders in the seventeenth century. The existence of such
competitive environment, in conjunction with the capitulation agreements, facilitated the process of
price transmission between Ottoman and European markets (Inalcik and Quataert, 1994, p. 482).45
As emerged from the empirical analysis, the share of integrated commodity markets exhibited
some geographic variation. This is because the weight and relative importance of the Ottoman
Empire’s main trading partners, the Italian city states, France, England, the Netherlands and the
42See for example Inalcik and Quataert (1994) and Stoianovich (1974).
43Ottoman traders belonging to non-Muslim minorities (Jews, Greeks and Armenians) thrived in many
European cities such as Venice, Ancona and Lwow. Ottoman Muslim merchants in Venice were given their
own fondaco dei Turci in 1592.
44For instance, between 1621 and 1721 Middle Eastern raw silk exports to England increased by 275%; silk
exports to the Low Countries rose considerably, too (C¸izakc¸a, 1985, 357). Between 1621-1634 and 1663-1669
exports of mohair yarn to England rose by 400% (Davis, 1970).
45See C¸izakc¸a (1985, p. 364) for Ottoman-European competition in the textile sector.
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Habsburg Empire, varied throughout the centuries, reflecting changes in economic and geopolitical
supremacy. At the beginning of our period the most active trade relationship occurred with the
Italian city of Venice, followed by Genoa and Florence. The Venetian and the Genoese were also
the main middlemen for Levantine products in North-Western Europe and Spain, which may help
explain the market integration findings for these parts of Europe (see Map 1 for an illustration of
the sea routes connecting the Ottoman Empire to Europe). The rise and fall from prominence of the
Italian traders, substituted first by the Dutch and English and then by the French, as discussed in
McGowan (1981, p.15), is broadly captured by our results. The Mediterranean was not always the
preferred choice of transportation and was often complemented by the land route, which connected
the Empire to Eastern and Central Europe, via the Danube and Transylvania (see Map 2). These
roads were actively used in the seventeenth century by Rumelian traders to buy and sell Ottoman
and European goods. Land-based trade thrived during this period thanks to the spread of large
trade fairs in the Balkans, such as those of Uzundjova and Plovdiv (Stoianovich, 1974; McGowan,
1981). In fact our results show that the majority of Eastern European markets were integrated with
the Ottoman capital during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
Beyond Transylvania, the caravan routes that connected the Empire to the Austrian border
flourished particularly during the eighteenth century, when the decrease in mercantile activities
in the Mediterranean shifted the commercial exchange of Ottoman-British goods by the way of
Vienna (Inalcik and Quataert, 1994, p.486). This was further facilitated by the growing importance
of the fairs of Leipzig, particularly active from the early 1700s, of those Komorn and Rusciuk on
the Danube (Stoianovich, 1974, p.98). An alternative way to exchange goods with Europe was
via Dubrovnik, used as a hub for both maritime trade via the Adriatic and overland trade via the
Balkans (Inalcik and Quataert, 1994, pp. 510-1).46 The active use of overland transit and the
alternative via Dubrovnik are at the bases of our broad findings of integration in Central European
cities of Leipzig, Augsburg, Strasbourg and Vienna, which were particularly strong in the 1691-1768
period.
Our results also show that London, Antwerp, and Amsterdam’s commodity market linkages
with Istanbul strengthened between the late seventeenth and the first decades of the nineteenth
46Dubrovnik was a tributary state of the Ottoman Empire, whereby trade was controlled by Italian-speaking
merchants of Slav background, who enjoyed special privileges within the Ottoman territory.
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century.47 England’s direct contact with the Empire started at the time of the Ottoman-Venetian
war (1570-3) and it was strengthened by the provision of full capitulatory privileges in May 1580
(Inalcik and Quataert, 1994) and the foundation of the Levant Company in 1581 (Willan, 1955).
Displacing the Venetians from the Mediterranean in the early seventeenth century, English trade
relations with the Porte remained intense until the first half of the eighteenth century.48 Trade
with the Dutch also strengthened from the 1570, spurred by the creation of a Turkish “nation”
of merchants in Antwerp in 1582 and the granting of capitulations in 1612. The consolidation of
the Dutch commercial position in the Levant continued until the late 1700s (Van der Wee, 2013,
p.257).49 The eighteenth century saw a shift in the Empire’s trade partners, as England was replaced
by France as major destination of Ottoman exports, and supplier of textiles.50 Our results capture
the increased importance of the French markets by showing a strengthening of integration between
Paris and Istanbul between 1691-1760 and 1761-1843.51
Turning commodities, finding evidence of price convergence for a wide range of goods reflects
the active competition between European and Ottoman markets. While various foodstuffs were
exported from the Ottoman territories, wheat deserves special attention, since it was the main traded
foodstuff in terms of value and quantity, over long periods of time (Braudel, 1995; McGowan, 1981,
pp.32-38). While it not possible to make generalisations about the levels of European-Ottoman
wheat trade, as these were not regularly recorded, we know that English and Dutch ships were
used to import Ottoman wheat and rice throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and
that the land route was also often used to trade grains, sometimes defying the Sultan’s interdiction
47On average the share of commodities integrated between these North-Western European cities and Istanbul
was 72% during 1691-1760.
48Ottoman-British trade was based on the English exporting woollen cloth, tin and lead and importing spices,
raw materials and various foodstuff, particularly currants, olive oil and wine (Brenner, 1972).
49The Ottomans supplied the Dutch with cotton, yarn, leather, honey and beeswax in exchange for lead, tin,
iron and steel.
50France’s status as leading trade partner was facilitated by the 1740 trade agreement which allowed French
goods to be imported at 3 percent custom rate, the lowest applicable to foreigners (Inalcik and Quataert,
1994, p.728).
51The integrated commodities are wood (1691-1760), soap and wheat (1761-1843).
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to export outside the Empire (Fekete and Ka´ldy-Nagy, 1962). Together with cereals, olive oil,
and its byproduct soap, were other important Ottoman exports to Europe between 1500 and 1800
(Stoianovich, 1974). The supply of Ottoman oil was in fact connected not only with European
demand for direct consumption, but also with the production needs of soap factories.52 That
oil and soap were import competing emerges, for example, from a series of records of the French
consuls in the Levant, who often opposed the establishment of Ottoman soap manufacturing, fearing
a decline in domestic production and export (Grenville, 1965).
7 The impact of conflict on integration
While our empirical analysis points to the existence of persistent economic ties between Europe
and the Ottoman Empire during 1469-1914, their relations were also shaped by conflict during this
time. The Empire looked westwards for territorial expansion, especially during its period of military
dominance (until the signing of the Treaty of Karlowitz, 1699) and made extensive territorial gains
in the Continent. The Ottoman-European wars were not only a matter of geopolitical supremacy,
but also a struggle between two rival faiths. Indeed, the religious divide between the two regions was
often at the basis of violent confrontations and it is regarded as a major barrier to their interaction
(Bosker et al., 2012, p.1423).
To what extent did conflict disrupt market integration between Europe and Istanbul? To mea-
sure the impact of war on commodity price transmission we use the following regression:
P (strong)itc = α1 + β OE − EUwarit + γ OEwart + ΨXi + δi + δt + δc + itc (12)
where P (strong)itc represents the posterior probability of the strong model for commodity c in
city i at time t; OE−EUwar denotes the number of wars between city i and the Ottoman Empire;
OE war takes the value of 1 if the Ottoman Empire was engaged in a non-European war; δi, δt and
δc are city, time and commodity-specific effects, respectively. The vector Xi contains a set of control
variables: sea route, which equals 1 if the main trade route between Istanbul and city i was via the
Mediterranean or the Atlantic and zero otherwise; distance is the geographic distance from Istanbul
52For example, the decline in labour employed in Marseille soap factories in 1788, led to a decline in Ottoman
oil exports in 1789.
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and city i;53 OE−EU casualties andOE casualties represent the number of casualties in European-
Ottoman wars and non-European Ottoman wars, respectively. The estimates of coefficient β are
our main point of interest.
To identify the number of wars between between each city in our sample and the Ottoman
Empire we utilise Brecke’s Conflict Catalog, a compilation of all violent conflicts that occurred
between 1400 and the present. The Catalog provides information about the number of wars, their
duration and the number of casualties.54 Figure 12 illustrates that conflicts between the Empire and
our sample of cities were frequent throughout the centuries. At the same time it is also important
to note that not all cities were directly involved in wars with the Empire.55
The results are presented in Table 1: columns I to V report OLS estimates, columns VI to
VIII poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimates; the standard errors are clustered at
the city level. The findings show that war per se did not have any impact on market integration
(columns I-III and VI). However, when controlling for the number of casualties the coefficient of war
becomes negative as significant, thus indicating that conflict intensity reduced the extent of price
convergence between Istanbul and Europe (columns IV and VII). Specifically, one additional war
lowered the posterior probability of the strong model by 1.7-2 per cent.56 We obtain similar results
when interacting war with duration (see coefficients on Eu − Ottoman war x time and Ottoman
war x time in columns V and VIII), confirming the negative effect of war intensity on price pass-
through. The computation of the marginal effects of war of conflict, illustrated in Figure 13, further
highlights the increasing impact of war on integration, as represented by the progressively stronger
incidence of conflict, as war intensifies.
8 Conclusion
Our investigation of integration between Europe and the Ottoman Empire shows that the linkages
between the two regions’ markets had different intensities, varying across the multiple dimensions
53The distance data are from geobytes, accessible at http://geobytes.com/get-city-details-api/
54The Catalog records all violent conflicts with at least 32 battle deaths. It is accessible at http://www.
cgeh.nl/data.
55For example Valencia, Augsburg and Leipzig never engaged in conflict with the Porte between 1469 and
1914.
56For the PPML regressions the formula to compute the effect of a coefficient is (eβ − 1)x100.
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of time, space and commodity type. By exploiting a rich dataset covering 20 cities, 9 commodities
and four and half centuries, we have provided new empirical evidence on the nature and degree of
market connections between two key regions of the international economy. Our findings also pointed
to comparable levels of allocative efficiency between Ottoman and European market institutions, as
measured by similar speeds of price pass-through embodied by the half-lives. The implementation
of a methodology based on dynamic factor models, using Bayesian inference, enabled us to over-
come some key challenges linked to the type of historical data we used and thus to offer the first
comprehensive empirical study of price transmission between Istanbul and a large set of European
cities.
While our findings stand in contrast with Bosker et al. (2012) key arguments on the lack of
interdependence between the Islamic world and Europe, they sit well with the predominantly qual-
itative historical literature on the economic relations between the two regions. As emphasised by
Ottoman-European historiography, we believe that the strong and long lasting integration patterns
between Europe and the Ottoman Empire emerging from our analysis reflected a continuous, but at
the same time evolving relationship of commercial exchange, resisting the disrupting forces of polit-
ical antagonism and conflict. Such exchange was predominantly shaped by an East to West flow of
primary goods, stimulated by an increase in European demand, especially Western European, from
the 16th century. Europe’s rising needs started attracting considerable quantities of agricultural
exports, dominated by food and fiber, part of which came from the Levant.57 Despite fluctuating
over time, in terms of volume and content, Ottoman products continued to penetrate and influ-
ence pre-industrial European markets, due to their import-competing nature. Their possibility to
compete with European prices reflected the Empire’s relative factor endowment, where a relatively
more extensive land frontier offered a cost advantage compared with European limited availability
of marginal lands and growing population. Such patterns of specialisation linked Ottoman and
European markets and enabled price transmission to take place and persist over the centuries.
57The Baltic shores were also key supplier of grain, mainly rye to Western Europe between the 16th and the
18th centuries.
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Table 1: The impact of war on integration
OLS PPML
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
N. Eu-Ottoman 0.008 0.003 0.002 -0.017* 0.003 -0.021**
wars (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007)
N. Ottoman -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
wars (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Eu-Ottoman -0.008* -0.011*
war x time (0.004) (0.004)
Ottoman 0.000 0.000
war x tine (0.000) (0.000)
Eu-Ottoman 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001*
war casualties (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ottoman -0.000** -0.000* -0.000*** -0.001***
war casualities (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Distance 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sea route 0.005 0.014 -0.009 -0.066 -0.318*** -0.011 -0.085 -0.457***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.046) (0.060) (0.011) (0.044) (0.063)
City FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time FE N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Commodity FE N N Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 431 431 431 130 116 431 130 116
R2+ 0.048 0.202 0.261 0.403 0.434 0.250 0.384 0.421
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
Columns I-V report OLS estimates, columns VI-VIII report poisson pseudo maximum likelihood
(PPML) estimates. Standard errors are clustered at the city level.
+ Pseudo R2 for PPML regressions
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Figure 1: Simulated data from a weak and a strong model
Note: The left panel is simulated from a simplified weak model
y1t = ft + e1t
y2t = 3ft + e2t,
where e1t and e2t are independent standard normal random variables and T = 500. The right panel is
simulated from a simplified strong model
y1t = ft + e1t
y2t = ft + e2t,
where e1t and e2t are independent standard normal random variables and T = 500.
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Figure 2: Posterior probabilities of strong, weak and no integration models: CPI, 1586-1690 and
1691-1768
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Figure 3: Posterior probabilities of strong, weak and no integration models: CPI, 1769-1843, 1844-
1914, 1569-1914
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Figure 4: Posterior probabilities of strong, weak and no integration models: olive oil
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Figure 5: Posterior probabilities of strong, weak and no integration models: rice
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Figure 6: Posterior probabilities of strong, weak and no integration models: soap
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Figure 7: Posterior probabilities of strong, weak and no integration models: wheat
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Figure 8: Share of integrated commodity markets across regions
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Note: Each panel illustrates the share of commodities in which the strong model of integration
is selected in each city. The values on top of each column indicate the number of integrated
commodities over total available markets in a specific location.
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Figure 9: Half-lives, 1586-1690
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Figure 10: Half-lives, 1691-1768
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Figure 11: Half-lives, 1769-1843
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Figure 12: Ottoman-European conflicts, 1469-1914
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Source: Brecke’s Conflict Catalog, http://www.cgeh.nl/data.
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Map 1: Sea routes between the Levant and Europe
 
Source: Inalcik and Quataert (1994, p. 318)
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Map 2: Land routes between Istanbul and Europe
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Source: McGowan (1981)
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Appendix
Appendix to the article: The evolution of Ottoman-European market linkages, 1469-1914: evidence
from dynamic factor models
A Univariate Model
A.1 Parameter Space
The parameters include α, β, φ and σ2. The collection of state variables f = (f1, f2, ..., fT )
′,
g1 = (g11, g12, ..., g1T )
′ and g2 = (g21, g22, ..., g2T )′ are also part of the parameter space. If some data
in y are missing, we also call them parameters because they are unknown.
Define y = (y1, y2, ..., yT )
′ as the collection of all yt including the imputed missing values.
A.2 Prior
1.
α ∼ N(mα, h−1α ), β ∼ N(mβ, h−1β )1(β > 0), γ ∼ N(mγ , h−1γ )1(γ > 0).
We assume independence between these parameters.
2.
σ2 ∼ IG(v/2, s/2)
3.
φ ∼ N(mφ, h−1φ )1(0 < φ < 1)
4. The first value of f :
f1 ∼ N(0, σ2f1)
5. The first value of g
g1 ∼ N(0, σ2g1)
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A.3 MCMC
1. Write xt = (ft, gt)
′. We apply the Chan and Jeliazkov’s(2009) method to write
xt = Axt−1 + et,
where A =
1 0
0 φ
 and et =
eft
ut
 ∼ N (0, I2). Stacking xt to obtain x = (x′1, x′2, ..., x′T )′,
so we have
Hx = ex,
whereH =

I2 0 0 ... 0 0
−A I2 0 ... 0 0
0 −A I2 ... 0 0
...
...
... ...
...
...
0 0 0 ... I2 0
0 0 0 ... −A I2

and ex ∼ N (0,Ω) with Ω =
diag(σ2f1 , σ2g1) 0
0 I2(T−1)
.
Hence the prior of x is
x ∼ N(0,K−1),
where K = H ′Ω−1H.
Clearly
y = 1Tα+Bx+ e,
where B = IT ⊗ (β, γ). Hence,
y | x ∼ N(1Tα+Bx, σ2IT ).
The conditional posterior is
x | y ∼ N(xˆ,K−1x ),
where Kx = K + σ
−2B′B and xˆ = K−1x
(
σ−2B′(y − 1Tα)
)
.
2. φ:
φ ∼ N(m,h−1)1(0 < φ < 1),
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where h = hφ +
T∑
t=2
g2t−1 and m = h−1(hφmφ +
T∑
t=2
gt−1gt).
3. α, β and γ are drawn conditionally
(a) Draw α from N(m,h
−1
), where h = hα +σ
−2T and m = h−1(hαmα +σ−2
T∑
t=1
(yt−βft−
γgt)).
(b) Draw γ from N(m,h
−1
)1(γ > 0), where h = hγ + σ
−2 T∑
t=1
g2t and m = h
−1
(hγmγ +
σ−2
T∑
t=1
gt(yt − α− βft)).
(c) Draw β from N(m,h
−1
)1(β > 0), where h = hβ + σ
−2 T∑
t=1
f2t and m = h
−1
(hβmβ +
σ−2
T∑
t=1
ft(yt − α− γgt)).
4. Simulate σ2 from
σ2 ∼ IG(v/2, s/2),
where
v = v + T
and
s = s+ eˆ′eˆ.
The error eˆ is defined as y −X(α, β, γ)′ with X = (1T , f, g).
5. Missing data. If yt is missing, we impute it by
yt ∼ N(α+ βft + γgt, σ2).
B Weak Model
B.1 Parameter Space
The parameters include αi, βi, φi, σ
2
i for i = 1, 2. The collection of state variables f = (f1, f2, ..., fT )
′,
g1 = (g11, g12, ..., g1T )
′ and g2 = (g21, g22, ..., g2T )′ are also part of the parameter space. If some data
in y are missing, we also call them parameters because they are unknown.
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We denote α = (α1, α2)
′ and β = (β1, β2)′. Define yi = (yi1, yi2, ..., yiT )′ as the collection of all
yit for country i including the imputed missing values.
B.2 Prior
1. For i = 1, 2,
(αi, βi, γi)
′ ∼ N(m,H−1)1(βi > 0 & γi > 0).
We assume independent priors, so it can also be written as
αi ∼ N(mα, h−1α ), βi ∼ N(mβ, h−1β )1(βi > 0), γi ∼ N(mγ , h−1γ )1(γi > 0).
2. For i = 1, 2,
σ2i ∼ IG(v/2, s/2)
3. For i = 1, 2,
φi ∼ N(mφ, h−1φ )1(0 < φi < 1),
where φ1 and φ2 are independent.
4. The first value of f :
f1 ∼ N(0, σ2f1)
5. For i = 1, 2, the first value of gi
gi1 ∼ N(0, σ2g1)
B.3 MCMC
1. Write xt = (ft, g1t, g2t)
′. We apply the Chan and Jeliazkov’s(2009) method to write
xt = Axt−1 + et,
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whereA =

1 0 0
0 φ1 0
0 0 φ2
 and et =

eft
u1t
u2t
 ∼ N (0, I3). Stacking xt to obtain x = (x′1, x′2, ..., x′T )′,
so we have
Hx = ex,
whereH =

I3 0 0 ... 0 0
−A I3 0 ... 0 0
0 −A I3 ... 0 0
...
...
... ...
...
...
0 0 0 ... I3 0
0 0 0 ... −A I3

and ex ∼ N (0,Ω) with Ω =
diag(σ2f1 , σ2g1 , σ2g1) 0
0 I3(T−1)
.
Hence the prior of x is
x ∼ N(0,K−1),
where K = H ′Ω−1H.
Stack data y = (y11, y21, y12, y22, ..., y1T , y2T )
′ to have
y = Cα+Bx+ e,
where C = 1T⊗I2, α = (α1, α2)′, B = IT⊗
β1 γ1 0
β2 0 γ2
 and e = (e11, e21, e12, e22, ..., e1T , e2T )′.
Hence,
y | x ∼ N(Cα+Bx,Σ),
where Σ = IT ⊗
σ21 0
0 σ22
. The conditional posterior is
x | y ∼ N(xˆ,K−1x ),
where Kx = K +B
′Σ−1B and xˆ = K−1x
(
B′Σ−1(y − Cα))
2. φi:
φi ∼ N(mi, h−1i )1(0 < φi < 1),
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where hi = hφ +
T∑
t=2
g2i,t−1 and mi = h
−1
i (hφmφ +
T∑
t=2
gi,t−1git) for i = 1, 2.
3. (αi, βi, γi) is drawn from
(αi, βi, γi)
′ ∼ N(mi, H−1i )1(βi > 0 & γi > 0),
where
H i = H + σ
−2
i X
′
iXi
and
mi = H
−1
i (Hm+ σ
−2
i X
′
iyi),
where Xi = (1, f, gi) is the regressor of yi.
Simulating from a joint truncated normal distribution is tricky, especially under multiple
restrictions. So a simple but inefficient way is to simulate αi, βi and γi separately as follows:
(a) Draw αi from N(mi, h
−1
i ), where hi = hα + σ
−2
i T and mi = h
−1
i (hαmα + σ
−2
i
T∑
t=1
(yit −
βift − γigit)).
(b) Draw βi from N(mi, h
−1
i )1(βi > 0), where hi = hβ + σ
−2
i
T∑
t=1
f2t and mi = h
−1
i (hβmβ +
σ−2i
T∑
t=1
ft(yit − αi − γigit)).
(c) Draw γi from N(mi, h
−1
i )1(γi > 0), where hi = hγ + σ
−2
i
T∑
t=1
g2it and mi = h
−1
i (hγmγ +
σ−2i
T∑
t=1
git(yit − αi − βift)).
4. Simulate σ2i from
σ2i ∼ IG(v/2, s/2),
where
v = v + T
and
s = s+ eˆ′ieˆi
with eˆi = yi −Xi(αi, βi, γi)′.
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5. Missing data. If yi,t is missing, we impute it by
yi,t ∼ N(αi + βift + γigit, σ2i ).
C Strong Model
C.1 Parameter Space
The parameters include αi, φi, σ
2
i for i = 1, 2 and β (common parameter). The collection of state
variables f = (f1, f2, ..., fT )
′, g1 = (g11, g12, ..., g1T )′ and g2 = (g21, g22, ..., g2T )′ are also part of the
parameter space. If some data in y are missing, we also call them parameters because they are
unknown.
We denote α = (α1, α2)
′ and β = (β1, β2)′. Define yi = (yi1, yi2, ..., yiT )′ as the collection of all
yit for country i including the imputed missing values.
C.2 Prior
1. For i = 1, 2,
αi ∼ N(mα, h−1α ), γi ∼ N(mγ , h−1γ )1(γi > 0)
and
β ∼ N(mβ, h−1β )1(β > 0).
We assume independence between these parameters.
2. For i = 1, 2,
σ2i ∼ IG(v/2, s/2)
3. For i = 1, 2,
φi ∼ N(mφ, h−1φ )1(0 < φi < 1),
where φ1 and φ2 are independent.
4. The first value of f :
f1 ∼ N(0, σ2f1)
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5. For i = 1, 2, the first value of gi
gi1 ∼ N(0, σ2g1)
C.3 MCMC
1. Write xt = (ft, g1t, g2t)
′. We apply the Chan and Jeliazkov’s(2009) method to write
xt = Axt−1 + et,
whereA =

1 0 0
0 φ1 0
0 0 φ2
 and et =

eft
u1t
u2t
 ∼ N (0, I3). Stacking xt to obtain x = (x′1, x′2, ..., x′T )′,
so we have
Hx = ex,
whereH =

I3 0 0 ... 0 0
−A I3 0 ... 0 0
0 −A I3 ... 0 0
...
...
... ...
...
...
0 0 0 ... I3 0
0 0 0 ... −A I3

and ex ∼ N (0,Ω) with Ω =
diag(σ2f1 , σ2g1 , σ2g1) 0
0 I3(T−1)
.
Hence the prior of x is
x ∼ N(0,K−1),
where K = H ′Ω−1H.
Stack data y = (y11, y21, y12, y22, ..., y1T , y2T )
′ to have
y = Cα+Bx+ e,
where C = 1T⊗I2, α = (α1, α2)′, B = IT⊗
β γ1 0
β 0 γ2
 and e = (e11, e21, e12, e22, ..., e1T , e2T )′.
Hence,
y | x ∼ N(Cα+Bx,Σ),
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where Σ = IT ⊗
σ21 0
0 σ22
. The conditional posterior is
x | y ∼ N(xˆ,K−1x ),
where Kx = K +B
′Σ−1B and xˆ = K−1x
(
B′Σ−1(y − Cα))
2. φi:
φi ∼ N(mi, h−1i )1(0 < φi < 1),
where hi = hφ +
T∑
t=2
g2i,t−1 and mi = h
−1
i (hφmφ +
T∑
t=2
gi,t−1git) for i = 1, 2.
3. αi, β and γi are drawn conditionally
(a) Draw αi from N(mi, h
−1
i ), where hi = hα + σ
−2
i T and mi = h
−1
i (hαmα + σ
−2
i
T∑
t=1
(yit −
βft − γigit)).
(b) Draw γi from N(mi, h
−1
i )1(γi > 0), where hi = hγ + σ
−2
i
T∑
t=1
g2it and mi = h
−1
i (hγmγ +
σ−2i
T∑
t=1
git(yit − αi − βft)).
(c) Draw β fromN(m,h
−1
)1(β > 0), where h = hβ+(σ
−2
1 +σ
−2
2 )
T∑
t=1
f2t andm = h
−1
(
hβmβ + σ
−2
1
T∑
t=1
ft(y1t − α1 − γ1g1t) + σ−22
T∑
t=1
ft(y2t − α2 − γ2g2t)
)
.
4. Simulate σ2i from
σ2i ∼ IG(v/2, s/2),
where
v = v + T
and
s = s+ eˆ′ieˆi.
The error eˆi is defined as yi −Xi(αi, β, γi)′ with Xi = (1T , f, gi).
5. Missing data. If yi,t is missing, we impute it by
yi,t ∼ N(αi + βft + γigit, σ2i ).
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Table A1: Marginal likelihood of CPI, 1586-1690
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Amsterdam 101/105 133.31 130.65 132.60 132.08 130.07 132.88
Antwerp 101/105 97.69 94.93 96.87 95.64 91.40 91.97
Augsburg 100/104 91.32 89.47 90.63 94.29 91.54 92.90
Gdansk 101/105 125.13 122.57 125.07 127.10 124.85 126.46
Krakow 101/105 156.90 154.42 156.44 155.21 151.79 153.11
Leipzig 99/103 120.70 117.95 119.98 118.59 114.39 115.64
London 101/105 104.03 101.88 104.34 102.05 99.45 101.83
Lwow 101/105 162.41 160.83 163.29 160.70 157.53 159.67
Madrid 101/105 92.56 91.28 93.53 90.98 88.54 91.73
Munich 101/105 93.01 91.88 94.49 94.83 92.09 94.31
Napoli 57/60 68.44 71.25 74.57 65.78 69.48 72.99
Paris 101/105 111.43 110.35 112.79 108.31 105.88 106.73
Strasbourg 101/105 98.91 95.85 99.04 97.85 93.08 95.45
Valencia 101/105 151.31 149.25 151.11 149.51 146.47 148.07
Vienna 101/105 100.62 98.48 101.26 99.36 95.79 98.19
Warsaw 101/105 127.74 125.80 128.34 126.02 122.67 123.27
Table A2: Posterior probability of CPI, 1586-1690
Posterior Probability
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Amsterdam 101/105 64% 4% 32% 30% 4% 66%
Antwerp 101/105 66% 4% 29% 96% 1% 2%
Augsburg 100/104 60% 9% 30% 76% 5% 19%
Gdansk 101/105 50% 4% 47% 61% 6% 32%
Krakow 101/105 58% 5% 37% 87% 3% 11%
Leipzig 99/103 65% 4% 31% 94% 1% 5%
London 101/105 40% 5% 55% 53% 4% 43%
Lwow 101/105 28% 6% 67% 71% 3% 26%
Madrid 101/105 26% 7% 67% 31% 3% 66%
Munich 101/105 18% 6% 77% 60% 4% 36%
Napoli 57/60 0% 3% 96% 0% 3% 97%
Paris 101/105 19% 6% 74% 77% 7% 16%
Strasbourg 101/105 46% 2% 52% 91% 1% 8%
Valencia 101/105 52% 7% 42% 78% 4% 19%
Vienna 101/105 33% 4% 63% 75% 2% 23%
Warsaw 101/105 34% 5% 61% 91% 3% 6%
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Table A3: Marginal likelihood of CPI,1691-1768
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Amsterdam 73/78 104.61 104.28 105.93 106.03 103.69 106.24
Antwerp 73/78 112.58 110.88 113.41 110.66 107.82 110.45
Augsburg 73/78 97.37 98.42 101.07 95.23 94.00 96.66
Gdansk 73/78 104.52 103.27 105.22 104.61 101.13 103.66
Krakow 73/78 127.65 125.90 129.02 126.17 122.74 125.87
Leipzig 73/78 72.43 71.44 73.51 75.58 73.80 74.23
London 73/78 110.97 110.55 112.66 109.74 108.40 110.25
Lwow 73/78 90.67 93.89 96.58 90.19 93.45 96.70
Madrid 73/78 88.27 87.43 89.73 87.68 83.51 85.57
Munich 70/75 101.63 103.24 105.68 99.78 99.88 102.30
Napoli 35/35 58.46 57.01 61.46 57.54 55.38 58.99
NorthernItaly 65/68 73.30 73.31 76.82 71.87 71.63 73.91
Paris 73/78 75.40 74.41 76.65 74.50 71.46 73.71
Strasbourg 73/78 98.00 95.80 98.44 97.52 93.58 96.07
Valencia 73/78 116.71 114.77 116.73 115.84 112.37 113.73
Vienna 73/78 98.17 97.99 100.09 96.95 95.93 98.16
Warsaw 73/78 98.12 97.19 100.09 97.54 95.34 98.91
Table A4: Posterior probability of CPI, 1691-1768
Posterior Probability
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Amsterdam 73/78 18% 13% 68% 43% 4% 53%
Antwerp 73/78 29% 5% 66% 54% 3% 43%
Augsburg 73/78 2% 6% 91% 18% 5% 76%
Gdansk 73/78 30% 9% 61% 70% 2% 27%
Krakow 73/78 20% 3% 77% 56% 2% 42%
Leipzig 73/78 23% 9% 68% 70% 12% 18%
London 73/78 14% 9% 77% 34% 9% 57%
Lwow 73/78 0% 6% 93% 0% 4% 96%
Madrid 73/78 17% 8% 75% 88% 1% 11%
Munich 70/75 2% 8% 91% 7% 8% 86%
Napoli 35/35 5% 1% 94% 19% 2% 79%
NorthernItaly 65/68 3% 3% 94% 11% 8% 81%
Paris 73/78 20% 8% 72% 66% 3% 30%
Strasbourg 73/78 38% 4% 58% 80% 2% 19%
Valencia 73/78 46% 7% 47% 87% 3% 10%
Vienna 73/78 12% 10% 79% 21% 8% 71%
Warsaw 73/78 12% 5% 84% 20% 2% 78%
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Table A5: Marginal likelihood of CPI, 1769-1843
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Amsterdam 71/75 72.38 71.00 73.75 70.88 67.76 71.03
Antwerp 71/75 54.94 54.21 56.69 52.82 49.53 53.01
Gdansk 42/46 14.14 12.18 13.40 18.91 21.57 18.26
Krakow 52/55 38.44 37.50 39.67 36.92 33.55 36.44
London 71/75 65.84 64.08 65.26 65.50 61.55 63.15
Madrid 71/75 11.91 12.29 14.89 17.31 16.35 19.33
Napoli 34/38 31.62 29.74 31.60 29.90 26.93 28.41
NorthernItaly 71/75 39.61 37.96 39.69 39.76 35.53 39.11
Strasbourg 71/75 70.21 68.14 70.13 68.89 65.03 67.37
Table A6: Posterior probability of CPI, 1769-1843
Posterior Probability
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Amsterdam 71/75 19% 5% 76% 46% 2% 52%
Antwerp 71/75 14% 7% 80% 45% 2% 53%
Gdansk 42/46 62% 9% 29% 6% 90% 3%
Krakow 52/55 21% 8% 71% 61% 2% 37%
London 71/75 58% 10% 32% 90% 2% 8%
Madrid 71/75 5% 7% 89% 11% 4% 84%
Napoli 34/38 47% 7% 46% 79% 4% 17%
NorthernItaly 71/75 44% 8% 48% 66% 1% 34%
Strasbourg 71/75 49% 6% 45% 81% 2% 17%
Table A7: Marginal likelihood of CPI, 1844-1914
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Amsterdam 37/67 88.29 85.63 87.24 87.40 83.34 85.58
Antwerp 39/70 69.47 65.99 66.68 68.59 63.53 64.14
Krakow 37/67 60.53 58.92 59.26 59.37 56.36 56.49
London 39/70 82.75 79.55 81.18 81.94 77.30 79.62
Madrid 39/70 72.36 69.63 71.08 71.17 67.28 68.61
NorthernItaly 40/71 71.71 70.29 71.09 70.83 68.69 70.52
Paris 39/70 83.26 80.29 81.76 82.29 77.78 79.65
Strasbourg 21/32 41.89 40.46 43.00 40.65 37.73 39.86
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Table A8: Posterior probability of CPI, 1844-1914
Posterior Probability
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Amsterdam 37/67 70% 5% 25% 85% 1% 14%
Antwerp 39/70 92% 3% 6% 98% 1% 1%
Krakow 37/67 67% 14% 19% 90% 4% 5%
London 39/70 80% 3% 17% 90% 1% 9%
Madrid 39/70 74% 5% 21% 91% 2% 7%
NorthernItaly 40/71 56% 14% 30% 54% 6% 40%
Paris 39/70 78% 4% 17% 92% 1% 7%
Strasbourg 21/32 23% 6% 71% 66% 4% 30%
Table A9: Marginal likelihood of CPI, 1469-1914
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Amsterdam 299/411 461.93 460.56 457.48 462.50 461.59 460.51
Antwerp 206/455 439.65 439.27 433.11 441.15 441.60 438.85
Augsburg 217/298 342.81 342.49 343.40 347.34 344.58 343.10
Gdansk 230/280 347.85 344.74 347.49 361.39 362.74 361.19
Krakow 285/422 587.85 588.95 587.89 582.66 586.27 579.57
Leipzig 206/230 280.26 280.43 284.52 289.85 285.74 290.66
London 206/438 509.81 508.75 499.98 512.50 511.50 508.16
Lwow 215/277 407.27 406.66 409.11 403.77 405.23 401.99
Madrid 297/363 330.83 332.52 336.82 338.42 339.28 340.76
Munich 193/297 345.69 345.53 343.37 348.04 345.75 344.33
Napoli 139/171 235.37 237.15 240.94 232.31 236.17 240.02
NorthernItaly 231/366 273.93 277.03 268.14 273.14 277.32 272.04
Paris 255/392 413.58 414.10 408.55 413.45 413.95 408.91
Strasbourg 288/407 488.74 489.45 485.91 489.08 488.53 484.17
Valencia 211/317 470.79 468.69 468.95 464.32 463.31 462.28
Vienna 223/330 428.22 427.37 427.94 427.01 422.71 423.45
Warsaw 210/239 340.57 340.05 340.37 333.50 335.21 336.41
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Table A10: Posterior probability of CPI, 1469-1914
Posterior Probability
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Amsterdam 299/411 79% 20% 1% 65% 26% 9%
Antwerp 206/455 59% 41% 0% 38% 59% 4%
Augsburg 217/298 28% 21% 51% 93% 6% 1%
Gdansk 230/280 57% 3% 40% 18% 68% 14%
Krakow 285/422 20% 59% 21% 3% 97% 0%
Leipzig 206/230 1% 2% 97% 31% 1% 69%
London 206/438 74% 26% 0% 72% 27% 1%
Lwow 215/277 13% 7% 80% 18% 79% 3%
Madrid 297/363 0% 1% 98% 7% 17% 75%
Munich 193/297 51% 44% 5% 89% 9% 2%
Napoli 139/171 0% 2% 97% 0% 2% 98%
NorthernItaly 231/366 4% 96% 0% 2% 98% 0%
Paris 255/392 37% 62% 0% 38% 62% 0%
Strasbourg 288/407 32% 66% 2% 63% 36% 0%
Valencia 211/317 78% 10% 12% 67% 24% 9%
Vienna 223/330 46% 20% 35% 96% 1% 3%
Warsaw 210/239 41% 25% 34% 4% 22% 74%
Table A11: Marginal likelihood of butter, 1586-1690
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Amsterdam 74/97 51.30 50.20 51.67 49.37 47.96 48.88
Antwerp 78/102 29.10 27.82 29.38 26.68 25.20 26.20
Gdansk 80/104 -10.57 -11.93 -9.22 -13.87 -15.38 -13.03
Leipzig 38/53 -12.91 -11.74 -10.86 -14.58 -13.52 -12.97
London 81/105 66.38 66.30 68.89 63.46 62.83 64.96
Lwow 45/50 -6.17 -6.68 -4.02 -7.86 -9.23 -5.87
Munich 38/42 -15.62 -16.05 -10.54 -18.11 -18.11 -12.84
Napoli 48/61 -4.59 -4.32 -1.57 -6.83 -6.79 -4.70
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Table A12: Posterior probability of butter, 1586-1690
Posterior Probability
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Amsterdam 74/97 36% 12% 52% 54% 13% 33%
Antwerp 78/102 38% 11% 51% 54% 12% 34%
Gdansk 80/104 20% 5% 75% 28% 6% 65%
Leipzig 38/53 8% 27% 65% 11% 33% 56%
London 81/105 7% 6% 87% 17% 9% 75%
Lwow 45/50 10% 6% 84% 12% 3% 85%
Munich 38/42 1% 0% 99% 1% 1% 99%
Napoli 48/61 4% 6% 90% 10% 10% 80%
Table A13: Marginal likelihood of butter, 1691-1768
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Amsterdam 48/78 62.14 64.71 67.09 60.50 62.52 65.41
Antwerp 44/72 36.31 34.53 36.82 35.33 33.28 35.61
Gdansk 48/78 37.14 35.60 37.81 35.90 33.18 34.48
Leipzig 26/39 0.72 -0.43 3.29 -0.12 -2.65 0.27
London 48/78 75.72 76.23 78.43 74.83 74.60 76.93
Lwow 31/53 -0.76 -1.49 -0.82 -1.42 -2.68 -3.39
Milano 41/68 48.79 49.50 52.85 48.47 48.92 52.01
Munich 31/53 58.61 56.31 59.55 58.08 55.42 58.49
Strasbourg 35/59 13.42 12.12 16.78 16.85 14.07 18.22
Vienna 33/54 25.91 27.78 31.24 24.21 25.70 29.40
Warsaw 37/59 6.25 6.81 10.98 4.55 4.60 8.61
Table A14: Posterior probability of butter, 1691-1768
Posterior Probability
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Amsterdam 48/78 1% 8% 91% 1% 5% 94%
Antwerp 44/72 35% 6% 59% 41% 5% 54%
Gdansk 48/78 32% 7% 62% 76% 5% 19%
Leipzig 26/39 7% 2% 91% 39% 3% 58%
London 48/78 6% 9% 85% 10% 8% 82%
Lwow 31/53 41% 20% 39% 70% 20% 10%
Milano 41/68 2% 3% 95% 3% 4% 93%
Munich 31/53 27% 3% 70% 39% 3% 58%
Strasbourg 35/59 3% 1% 96% 20% 1% 79%
Vienna 33/54 0% 3% 96% 1% 2% 97%
Warsaw 37/59 1% 1% 98% 2% 2% 97%
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Table A15: Marginal likelihood of butter, 1769-1843
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Amsterdam 50/73 67.91 66.36 67.82 66.05 63.47 65.19
Antwerp 28/36 2.10 -0.43 0.58 0.72 -2.81 -2.12
Gdansk 32/47 -14.75 -16.36 -14.89 -16.15 -18.06 -17.12
Leipzig 28/42 3.69 1.28 3.79 1.92 0.09 1.22
London 52/75 22.83 20.15 21.66 21.10 17.11 18.63
Milano 50/72 42.40 40.28 40.77 40.41 37.00 37.00
Strasbourg 33/45 9.66 8.22 9.78 7.60 4.75 6.39
Table A16: Posterior probability of butter, 1769-1843
Posterior Probability
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Amsterdam 50/73 47% 10% 43% 67% 5% 28%
Antwerp 28/36 77% 6% 17% 92% 3% 5%
Gdansk 32/47 48% 10% 42% 65% 10% 25%
Leipzig 28/42 45% 4% 50% 60% 10% 30%
London 52/75 72% 5% 23% 91% 2% 8%
Milano 50/72 76% 9% 15% 94% 3% 3%
Strasbourg 33/45 42% 10% 48% 74% 4% 22%
Table A17: Marginal likelihood of butter, 1844-1914
City Overlap/Total
(AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Amsterdam 47/70 64.92 64.00 65.75 63.26 61.20 63.03
Lwow 48/70 50.35 48.18 48.86 48.64 45.29 45.27
Vienna 48/71 51.09 49.35 50.54 49.64 46.84 48.04
Table A18: Posterior probability of butter, 1844-1914
Posterior Probability
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Amsterdam 47/70 27% 11% 62% 52% 7% 41%
Lwow 48/70 17% 9% 75% 94% 3% 3%
Vienna 48/71 33% 10% 57% 79% 5% 16%
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Table A19: Marginal likelihood of butter, 1469-1914
City Overlap/Total
(AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Amsterdam 227/401 332.44 332.84 332.84 328.04 327.48 325.85
Lwow 143/201 48.40 46.72 49.49 44.63 42.61 42.00
Table A20: Posterior probability of butter, 1469-1914
Posterior Probability
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Amsterdam 227/401 31% 46% 23% 60% 34% 7%
Lwow 143/201 24% 4% 71% 83% 11% 6%
Table A21: Marginal likelihood of charcoal, 1691-1768
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Antwerp 36/78 45.42 43.76 47.01 44.03 41.88 45.17
Madrid 36/78 30.43 27.34 29.62 29.79 25.86 27.86
NorthernItaly 36/68 107.89 105.45 108.91 107.28 103.91 107.61
Paris 34/65 25.27 24.30 26.02 26.13 25.76 26.58
Valencia 36/78 48.64 47.22 49.30 47.25 45.42 48.80
Warsaw 28/52 22.75 20.78 21.40 22.69 20.79 21.61
Table A22: Posterior probability of charcoal, 1691-1768
Posterior Probability
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Antwerp 36/78 16% 3% 81% 24% 3% 74%
Madrid 36/78 67% 3% 30% 86% 2% 12%
NorthernItaly 36/68 26% 2% 72% 41% 1% 57%
Paris 34/65 29% 11% 60% 31% 21% 48%
Valencia 36/78 31% 8% 61% 17% 3% 80%
Warsaw 28/52 72% 10% 19% 67% 10% 23%
Table A23: Marginal likelihood of charcoal, 1769-1843
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Strasbourg 21/40 8.77 8.04 10.59 9.48 8.70 11.01
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Table A24: Posterior probability of charcoal, 1769-1843
Posterior Probability
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Strasbourg 21/40 13% 6% 81% 17% 8% 76%
Table A25: Marginal likelihood of charcoal, 1469-1914
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
NorthernItaly 64/160 194.33 188.27 193.58 193.22 185.58 193.13
Table A26: Posterior probability of charcoal, 1469-1914
Posterior Probability
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR (8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
NorthernItaly 64/160 68% 0% 32% 52% 0% 48%
Table A27: Marginal likelihood of chickpeas, 1586-1690
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Amsterdam 38/50 -45.24 -44.86 -40.80 -45.47 -45.46 -41.79
Antwerp 70/102 -53.94 -55.13 -52.15 -55.50 -56.33 -52.77
Augsburg 51/74 -69.39 -71.12 -66.38 -68.56 -71.24 -65.77
Gdansk 70/103 -39.57 -39.46 -35.46 -35.10 -35.17 -31.56
Krakow 55/82 -71.34 -72.18 -68.96 -70.10 -71.15 -67.45
Leipzig 55/84 -77.69 -77.74 -74.10 -78.71 -81.36 -76.76
Lwow 38/55 -61.20 -60.30 -57.21 -63.22 -60.26 -59.79
Vienna 72/105 -57.09 -57.67 -53.39 -56.88 -59.63 -55.13
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Table A28: Posterior probability of chickpeas, 1586-1690
Posterior Probability
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR (8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Amsterdam 38/50 1% 2% 97% 2% 2% 95%
Antwerp 70/102 14% 4% 82% 6% 3% 91%
Augsburg 51/74 5% 1% 94% 6% 0% 94%
Gdansk 70/103 2% 2% 97% 3% 3% 95%
Krakow 55/82 8% 4% 88% 6% 2% 91%
Leipzig 55/84 3% 3% 95% 12% 1% 87%
Lwow 38/55 2% 4% 94% 2% 38% 61%
Vienna 72/105 2% 1% 96% 15% 1% 84%
Table A29: Marginal likelihood of chickpeas, 1691-1768
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Amsterdam 31/55 -42.14 -42.55 -40.81 -44.72 -45.38 -43.61
Augsburg 33/63 -29.95 -29.92 -28.62 -31.93 -31.92 -30.82
Gdansk 38/78 -33.00 -32.75 -31.02 -34.65 -34.89 -33.09
Krakow 35/70 -43.94 -43.50 -40.57 -43.46 -43.37 -40.38
Leipzig 34/62 -49.76 -49.83 -46.88 -51.43 -52.35 -49.65
Madrid 33/70 -45.30 -50.70 -47.00 -46.85 -53.81 -51.31
Strasbourg 33/63 -8.78 -10.29 -7.29 -9.89 -12.17 -9.74
Table A30: Posterior probability of chickpeas, 1691-1768
Posterior Probability
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Amsterdam 31/55 18% 12% 69% 22% 11% 67%
Augsburg 33/63 17% 18% 65% 20% 20% 60%
Gdansk 38/78 10% 13% 76% 15% 12% 73%
Krakow 35/70 3% 5% 92% 4% 5% 91%
Leipzig 34/62 5% 5% 90% 14% 5% 81%
Madrid 33/70 84% 0% 15% 99% 0% 1%
Strasbourg 33/63 18% 4% 78% 44% 5% 51%
68
Table A31: Marginal likelihood of chickpeas, 1769-1843
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Amsterdam 32/65 -15.54 -15.66 -13.08 -16.93 -17.33 -15.06
Augsburg 20/30 -30.32 -30.30 -29.10 -30.72 -31.59 -31.11
Leipzig 28/42 -28.24 -27.95 -27.20 -29.11 -29.46 -29.75
Napoli 21/32 -13.45 -14.21 -12.67 -13.70 -14.98 -13.68
Strasbourg 36/72 -4.25 -5.36 -3.64 -3.33 -4.75 -3.25
Warsaw 20/31 -35.34 -35.66 -34.19 -35.00 -36.06 -34.58
Table A32: Posterior probability of chickpeas, 1769-1843
Posterior Probability
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Amsterdam 32/65 7% 7% 86% 12% 8% 79%
Augsburg 20/30 19% 19% 62% 48% 20% 32%
Leipzig 28/42 19% 26% 55% 45% 31% 24%
Napoli 21/32 27% 13% 60% 44% 12% 44%
Strasbourg 36/72 32% 10% 58% 43% 10% 47%
Warsaw 20/31 20% 15% 65% 35% 12% 53%
Table A33: Marginal likelihood of chickpeas, 1844-1914
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Amsterdam 30/65 12.89 9.40 11.62 11.16 7.41 9.06
Krakow 31/70 -4.24 -7.43 -5.74 -6.17 -9.51 -7.35
Lwow 31/71 -17.25 -20.47 -18.73 -18.78 -22.00 -19.21
Vienna 31/71 11.35 8.75 12.07 8.91 6.20 9.04
Table A34: Posterior probability of chickpeas, 1844-1914
Posterior Probability
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Amsterdam 30/65 76% 2% 21% 87% 2% 11%
Krakow 31/70 79% 3% 18% 75% 3% 23%
Lwow 31/71 79% 3% 18% 59% 2% 39%
Vienna 31/71 32% 2% 66% 45% 3% 52%
69
Table A35: Marginal likelihood of chickpeas, 1469-1914
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Amsterdam 136/285 -71.41 -71.13 -73.39 -77.04 -77.26 -78.47
Gdansk 130/240 -67.95 -66.67 -61.79 -72.50 -70.41 -66.44
Krakow 163/376 -167.75 -167.74 -181.48 -171.21 -170.66 -173.97
Leipzig 119/196 -133.30 -136.54 -133.26 -140.61 -141.92 -138.66
Vienna 150/319 -114.55 -114.13 -121.26 -123.29 -122.29 -123.65
Table A36: Posterior probability of chickpeas, 1469-1914
Posterior Probability
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Amsterdam 136/285 41% 54% 6% 49% 39% 12%
Gdansk 130/240 0% 2% 98% 0% 2% 98%
Krakow 163/376 50% 50% 0% 36% 62% 2%
Leipzig 119/196 48% 2% 50% 12% 3% 85%
Vienna 150/319 40% 60% 0% 23% 61% 16%
Table A37: Marginal likelihood of honey, 1586-1690
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Augsburg 53/76 10.15 9.08 11.53 6.63 4.87 7.32
Madrid 60/90 0.60 2.57 5.15 -3.12 -2.71 -0.13
Valencia 72/105 27.55 26.91 29.61 22.64 21.50 24.40
Table A38: Posterior probability of honey, 1586-1690
Posterior Probability
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Augsburg 53/76 19% 6% 75% 32% 5% 63%
Madrid 60/90 1% 7% 92% 4% 7% 89%
Valencia 72/105 11% 6% 84% 14% 4% 82%
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Table A39: Marginal likelihood of honey, 1691-1768
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Madrid 46/77 7.40 6.62 8.43 4.96 3.30 5.39
NorthernItaly 40/68 34.75 32.18 35.31 33.20 30.95 33.44
Valencia 42/78 3.17 4.95 7.01 1.49 3.30 5.59
Warsaw 39/66 31.69 29.99 31.30 30.12 29.70 30.88
Table A40: Posterior probability of honey, 1691-1768
Posterior Probability
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Madrid 46/77 24% 11% 66% 37% 7% 56%
NorthernItaly 40/68 35% 3% 62% 42% 4% 53%
Valencia 42/78 2% 11% 87% 1% 9% 89%
Warsaw 39/66 54% 10% 36% 26% 17% 56%
Table A41: Marginal likelihood of honey, 1769-1843
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
NorthernItaly 55/72 2.16 1.57 3.49 1.60 -1.09 2.14
Table A42: Posterior probability of honey, 1769-1843
Posterior Probability
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
NorthernItaly 55/72 19% 10% 71% 36% 2% 62%
Table A43: Marginal likelihood of honey, 1469-1914
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Madrid 132/221 32.92 37.27 42.35 26.96 28.93 33.68
NorthernItaly 98/144 51.25 50.98 51.81 50.05 49.10 47.01
Valencia 142/278 62.55 59.57 58.47 56.40 55.21 52.86
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Table A44: Posterior probability of honey, 1469-1914
Posterior Probability
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Madrid 132/221 0% 1% 99% 0% 1% 99%
NorthernItaly 98/144 28% 22% 50% 70% 27% 3%
Valencia 142/278 94% 5% 2% 75% 23% 2%
Table A45: Marginal likelihood of olive oil, 1586-1690
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Krakow 55/68 5.50 6.98 8.89 3.95 5.89 8.17
Madrid 78/104 21.79 22.19 28.07 20.80 21.89 27.83
Valencia 79/105 22.81 25.28 28.48 19.98 22.78 25.29
Table A46: Posterior probability of olive oil, 1586-1690
Posterior Probability
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Krakow 55/68 3% 13% 85% 1% 9% 89%
Madrid 78/104 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 100%
Valencia 79/105 0% 4% 96% 0% 8% 92%
Table A47: Marginal likelihood of olive oil, 1691-1768
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Krakow 58/68 -7.78 -5.36 -2.82 -9.93 -7.95 -5.85
London 53/62 21.82 20.22 23.41 17.79 17.02 19.62
Madrid 64/74 -13.78 -15.32 -12.84 -16.01 -18.15 -15.78
Milano 57/68 43.64 41.06 42.60 41.59 38.67 40.08
Strasbourg 42/49 -2.34 -2.73 -0.28 -4.67 -6.02 -4.62
Valencia 65/77 7.99 6.93 9.90 5.84 4.28 7.22
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Table A48: Posterior probability of olive oil, 1691-1768
Posterior Probability
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Krakow 58/68 1% 7% 92% 1% 11% 88%
London 53/62 16% 3% 80% 13% 6% 81%
Madrid 64/74 26% 6% 68% 42% 5% 53%
Milano 57/68 70% 5% 25% 78% 4% 17%
Strasbourg 42/49 11% 7% 82% 43% 11% 45%
Valencia 65/77 12% 4% 83% 19% 4% 77%
Table A49: Marginal likelihood of olive oil, 1769-1843
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Milano 54/72 42.83 42.47 44.86 41.49 40.29 42.45
Table A50: Posterior probability of olive oil, 1769-1843
Posterior Probability
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Milano 54/72 11% 7% 82% 26% 8% 67%
Table A51: Marginal likelihood of olive oil, 1469-1914
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Krakow 131/162 25.28 26.84 28.61 23.83 25.82 28.12
Madrid 165/270 36.59 39.08 42.78 34.05 33.99 39.58
Milano 124/157 143.73 143.36 146.23 138.91 138.59 138.03
Valencia 165/319 85.55 89.23 90.95 83.16 78.69 82.23
Table A52: Posterior probability of olive oil, 1469-1914
Posterior Probability
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Krakow 131/162 3% 14% 83% 1% 9% 90%
Madrid 165/270 0% 2% 97% 0% 0% 99%
Milano 124/157 7% 5% 88% 47% 34% 19%
Valencia 165/319 85% 15% 0% 48% 1% 51%
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Table A53: Marginal likelihood of rice, 1586-1690
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Augsburg 40/47 -16.34 -17.77 -13.71 -18.97 -20.91 -17.78
Milano 65/86 47.38 45.39 48.84 44.86 42.36 44.45
Valencia 77/102 48.09 47.15 48.85 45.35 44.05 46.05
Table A54: Posterior probability of rice, 1586-1690
Posterior Probability
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Augsburg 40/47 7% 2% 92% 23% 3% 74%
Milano 65/86 18% 3% 79% 57% 5% 38%
Valencia 77/102 28% 11% 60% 30% 8% 61%
Table A55: Marginal likelihood of rice, 1769-1843
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Milano 31/72 12.33 12.11 15.72 15.75 14.27 18.03
Strasbourg 19/21 -0.67 -0.83 1.87 -2.21 -3.43 -0.99
Warsaw 24/28 3.29 4.14 7.94 1.65 1.46 5.15
Table A56: Posterior probability of rice, 1769-1843
Posterior Probability
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Milano 31/72 3% 3% 94% 9% 2% 89%
Strasbourg 19/21 7% 6% 87% 21% 6% 72%
Warsaw 24/28 1% 2% 97% 3% 2% 95%
Table A57: Marginal likelihood of rice, 1844-1914
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Vienna 60/71 75.20 72.70 75.58 74.23 68.96 71.81
74
Table A58: Posterior probability of rice, 1844-1914
Posterior Probability
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Vienna 60/71 39% 3% 57% 91% 0% 8%
Table A59: Marginal likelihood of rice, 1469-1914
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Milano 124/253 119.2 115.1 118.9 117.91 112.17 114.14
Table A60: Posterior probability of rice, 1469-1914
Posterior Probability
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Milano 124/253 57% 1% 42% 97% 0% 2%
Table A61: Marginal likelihood of soap, 1691-1768
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Milano 30/68 39.80 39.29 43.14 37.85 37.21 41.16
Table A62: Posterior probability of soap, 1691-1768
Posterior Probability
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Milano 30/68 3% 2% 95% 3% 2% 95%
Table A63: Marginal likelihood of soap, 1769-1843
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Amsterdam 46/65 36.35 35.59 39.83 35.62 32.57 36.80
Leipzig 29/42 27.40 25.45 28.43 26.47 24.36 27.31
Milano 51/72 31.73 34.37 37.84 30.55 32.22 34.83
Paris 30/42 23.37 22.57 25.93 21.75 19.19 22.74
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Table A64: Posterior probability of soap, 1769-1843
Posterior Probability
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Amsterdam 46/65 3% 1% 96% 23% 1% 76%
Leipzig 29/42 25% 4% 71% 29% 4% 68%
Milano 51/72 0% 3% 97% 1% 7% 92%
Paris 30/42 7% 3% 90% 27% 2% 71%
Table A65: Marginal likelihood of soap, 1844-1914
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Milano 12/17 -4.75 -6.72 -5.47 -4.88 -7.02 -6.20
Table A66: Posterior probability of soap, 1844-1914
Posterior Probability
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Milano 12/17 62% 9% 30% 72% 8% 19%
Table A67: Marginal likelihood of soap, 1469-1914
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Milano 93/157 96.58 97.70 99.64 91.35 93.16 94.99
Table A68: Posterior probability of soap, 1469-1914
Posterior Probability
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Milano 93/157 4% 12% 84% 2% 14% 84%
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Table A69: Marginal likelihood of wheat, 1691-1768
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Amsterdam 35/78 -8.01 -6.68 -4.45 -7.57 -6.79 -3.88
Firenze 35/78 -1.12 -0.63 1.86 3.93 4.37 6.81
Gdansk 30/66 -4.35 -3.40 -1.51 -0.91 -0.82 1.89
Leipzig 31/72 -18.69 -18.52 -15.18 -18.34 -19.44 -16.52
London 35/78 -19.09 -18.32 -15.20 -17.53 -16.00 -11.96
Madrid 34/73 -35.16 -35.47 -31.72 -35.68 -36.56 -33.03
Milano 31/68 11.76 10.98 12.66 17.81 17.61 18.29
Munich 25/55 -29.70 -29.84 -27.63 -30.89 -31.30 -28.93
Napoli 30/72 -15.22 -13.87 -10.46 -13.24 -11.32 -7.93
Paris 35/78 -36.24 -37.36 -35.11 -34.22 -36.35 -33.97
Strasbourg 35/78 -27.01 -29.12 -26.53 -26.20 -29.19 -26.97
Valencia 35/78 26.83 27.51 29.96 28.65 28.20 30.80
Vienna 35/78 -9.85 -10.27 -6.36 -9.74 -10.52 -5.69
Table A70: Posterior probability of wheat, 1691-1768
Posterior Probability
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Amsterdam 35/78 3% 9% 88% 2% 5% 93%
Firenze 35/78 4% 7% 88% 5% 8% 87%
Gdansk 30/66 5% 12% 83% 5% 6% 89%
Leipzig 31/72 3% 3% 94% 13% 4% 82%
London 35/78 2% 4% 94% 0% 2% 98%
Madrid 34/73 3% 2% 95% 6% 3% 91%
Milano 31/68 26% 12% 63% 29% 24% 47%
Munich 25/55 10% 9% 81% 11% 8% 81%
Napoli 30/72 1% 3% 96% 0% 3% 96%
Paris 35/78 23% 7% 70% 42% 5% 53%
Strasbourg 35/78 36% 4% 59% 66% 3% 31%
Valencia 35/78 4% 8% 88% 10% 6% 84%
Vienna 35/78 3% 2% 95% 2% 1% 98%
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Table A71: Marginal likelihood of wheat, 1769-1843
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Amsterdam 28/48 -19.10 -20.15 -16.07 -12.54 -16.07 -12.57
Antwerp 43/71 -2.14 -1.38 0.77 1.75 0.08 2.41
Augsburg 30/52 -34.36 -31.30 -27.48 -32.98 -30.30 -26.59
Gdansk 28/47 -18.36 -19.40 -16.55 -15.83 -19.08 -16.77
Krakow 45/74 -57.07 -59.83 -58.85 -56.14 -60.35 -58.43
London 45/75 -16.53 -18.23 -14.80 -14.80 -18.38 -15.78
Madrid 13/24 -26.76 -28.06 -24.49 -26.07 -28.41 -25.73
Milano 43/72 -5.52 -6.87 -3.60 1.24 -3.71 1.02
Munich 42/67 -24.87 -23.38 -21.59 -23.22 -22.45 -20.27
Paris 33/58 -11.34 -9.22 -7.15 -7.93 -7.27 -5.71
Strasbourg 44/73 -17.69 -17.72 -14.14 -11.59 -13.56 -10.20
Vienna 45/75 -30.68 -30.19 -26.33 -30.72 -32.17 -28.34
Warsaw 30/51 -32.10 -31.87 -29.61 -31.83 -33.96 -31.65
Table A72: Posterior probability of wheat, 1769-1843
Posterior Probability
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Amsterdam 28/48 5% 2% 94% 50% 1% 49%
Antwerp 43/71 5% 10% 85% 32% 6% 62%
Augsburg 30/52 0% 2% 98% 0% 2% 97%
Gdansk 28/47 13% 5% 82% 70% 3% 27%
Krakow 45/74 81% 5% 14% 90% 1% 9%
London 45/75 15% 3% 83% 71% 2% 27%
Madrid 13/24 9% 2% 88% 40% 4% 56%
Milano 43/72 12% 3% 84% 55% 0% 44%
Munich 42/67 3% 14% 83% 4% 10% 86%
Paris 33/58 1% 11% 88% 8% 16% 76%
Strasbourg 44/73 3% 3% 95% 19% 3% 78%
Vienna 45/75 1% 2% 97% 8% 2% 90%
Warsaw 30/51 7% 9% 84% 43% 5% 52%
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Table A73: Marginal likelihood of wheat, 1844-1914
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Amsterdam 41/47 19.65 19.55 21.57 18.31 16.83 18.84
Antwerp 48/69 22.94 24.52 25.22 20.92 20.98 20.78
Krakow 48/71 9.58 11.31 13.66 8.37 7.78 9.85
London 48/71 26.86 27.52 28.00 27.25 26.03 26.38
Munich 48/70 19.10 18.68 21.36 16.53 13.15 15.53
Paris 48/70 15.80 16.34 18.59 13.82 12.22 13.97
Vienna 48/70 -3.14 -3.77 -2.80 -5.18 -8.81 -9.63
Warsaw 48/71 18.85 21.47 23.04 18.14 18.86 20.35
Table A74: Posterior probability of wheat, 1844-1914
Posterior Probability
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Amsterdam 41/47 11% 10% 78% 34% 8% 35%
Antwerp 48/69 6% 31% 63% 34% 36% 29%
Krakow 48/71 2% 9% 88% 17% 9% 74%
London 48/71 16% 32% 52% 58% 17% 24%
Munich 48/70 9% 6% 85% 71% 2% 26%
Paris 48/70 5% 9% 86% 43% 8% 48%
Vienna 48/70 34% 18% 48% 96% 3% 1%
Warsaw 48/71 1% 17% 82% 8% 17% 75%
Table A75: Marginal likelihood of wheat, 1469-1914
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Krakow 109/236 -82.59 -81.54 -86.92 -82.93 -78.60 -81.02
Vienna 132/328 -87.18 -82.47 -83.92 -86.03 -82.17 -83.94
Warsaw 97/183 -30.66 -25.68 -26.57 -26.60 -23.05 -21.92
Table A76: Posterior probability of wheat, 1469-1914
Posterior Probability
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Krakow 109/236 26% 74% 0% 1% 91% 8%
Vienna 132/328 1% 80% 19% 2% 84% 14%
Warsaw 97/183 0% 71% 29% 1% 24% 75%
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Table A77: Marginal likelihood of wood, 1691-1768
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Augsburg 26/78 51.31 52.06 54.13 55.15 54.47 56.74
Gdansk 26/78 32.30 33.13 35.55 36.40 36.84 40.98
Madrid 36/78 29.65 30.52 33.21 33.66 33.60 36.44
NorthernItaly 36/68 23.78 25.37 29.66 27.45 28.01 31.46
Paris 29/58 24.15 24.70 28.39 27.11 25.89 29.81
Warsaw 35/75 -10.71 -10.19 -6.49 -6.96 -8.59 -6.06
Table A78: Posterior probability of wood, 1691-1768
Posterior Probability
City Overlap/Total
AR(1) AR(8)
No Weak Strong No Weak Strong
Augsburg 26/78 5% 11% 84% 16% 8% 77%
Gdansk 26/78 3% 8% 89% 1% 2% 97%
Madrid 36/78 3% 6% 91% 5% 5% 89%
NorthernItaly 36/68 0% 1% 98% 2% 3% 95%
Paris 29/58 1% 2% 96% 6% 2% 92%
Warsaw 35/75 1% 2% 96% 27% 5% 67%
Table A79: Adjusted Half-life (Monthly), CPI
City Year Half Lives (European City) Half Lives (Istanbul)
Napoli 1586-1690 2.271 0.229
Augsburg 1691-1768 1.793 0.796
Lwow 1691-1768 16.004 38.723
Munich 1691-1768 9.628 3.479
Napoli 1691-1768 10.351 8.493
NorthernItaly 1691-1768 5.044 6.290
Warsaw 1691-1768 77.948 4.751
Antwerp 1691-1768 16.844 2.558
Madrid 1691-1768 4.939 2.454
Leipzig 1469-1914 1.565 3.614
Lwow 1469-1914 1338.227 0.807
Madrid 1469-1914 2.599 1.761
Napoli 1469-1914 29.660 2.163
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Table A80: Adjusted Half-life (Monthly), Butter
City Sample Half Life (European City) Half Life (Istanbul)
London 1586-1690 2.428 0.107
Lwow 1586-1690 18.301 0.097
Munich 1586-1690 0.137 0.087
Napoli 1586-1691 0.994 0.098
Amsterdam 1691-1768 11.450 1.706
Leipzig 1691-1768 8.234 1.625
London 1691-1768 3.558 1.334
Milano 1691-1768 16.263 3.161
Strasbourg 1691-1768 5.219 1.576
Vienna 1691-1768 2.934 2.037
Warsaw 1691-1768 0.350 2.381
Table A81: Adjusted Half-life (Monthly), Charcoal
City Sample Half Life (European City) Half Life (Istanbul)
Antwerp 1691-1768 8.885 49.857
Strasbourg 1769-1843 4.132 5.434
Table A82: Adjusted Half-life (Monthly), Chickpeas
City Sample Half Life (European City) Half Life (Istanbul)
Amsterdam 1586-1690 0.211 0.176
Antwerp 1586-1690 0.109 0.254
Augsburg 1586-1690 0.121 0.415
Gdansk 1586-1690 0.545 0.183
Krakow 1586-1690 0.207 0.229
Leipzig 1586-1690 1.372 0.268
Lwow 1586-1690 0.391 0.156
Vienna 1586-1690 1.186 0.187
Krakow 1691-1768 1.342 1.114
Leipzig 1691-1768 0.288 5.772
Amsterdam 1769-1843 2.204 0.361
Gdansk 1469-1914 0.210 0.249
81
Table A83: Adjusted Half-life (Monthly), Honey
City Sample Half Life (European City) Half Life (Istanbul)
Madrid 1586-1690 0.285 0.154
Valencia 1586-1690 0.630 0.354
Valencia 1691-1768 0.286 0.273
Madrid 1469-1914 0.209 0.288
Table A84: Adjusted Half-life (Monthly), Olive Oil
City Sample Half Life (European City) Half Life (Istanbul)
Krakow 1586-1690 1.191 0.161
Madrid 1586-1690 0.169 0.121
Valencia 1586-1690 0.252 0.153
Krakow 1691-1768 0.441 0.126
London 1691-1768 36.971 0.359
Strasbourg 1691-1768 7.186 0.146
Valencia 1691-1768 4.769 0.141
Milano 1769-1843 4.734 3.354
Krakow 1469-1914 0.269 1.562
Madrid 1469-1914 0.104 0.433
Milano 1469-1914 1987.169 1.331
Table A85: Adjusted Half-life (Monthly), Rice
City Sample Half Life (European City) Half Life (Istanbul)
Augsburg 1586-1690 25.244 0.087
Milano 1769-1843 6.636 2.602
Strasbourg 1769-1843 21.936 3.662
Warsaw 1769-1843 4.285 1.533
Table A86: Adjusted Half-life (Monthly), Soap
City Sample Half Life (European City) Half Life (Istanbul)
Milano 1691-1768 10.310 0.543
Milano 1769-1843 2.237 3.177
Paris 1769-1843 4.977 5.643
Milano 1469-1914 23.502 2.123
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Table A87: Adjusted Half-life (Monthly), Wheat
City Sample Half Life (European City) Half Life (Istanbul)
Amsterdam 1691-1768 12.820 9.776
Firenze 1691-1768 2.102 4.304
Gdansk 1691-1768 5.918 11.227
Leipzig 1691-1768 1.062 6.668
London 1691-1768 1.470 13.375
Madrid 1691-1768 0.250 2.260
Munich 1691-1768 0.375 9.572
Napoli 1691-1768 0.106 1.783
Valencia 1691-1768 9.602 2.903
Vienna 1691-1768 1.086 3.338
Amsterdam 1769-1843 5.057 14.491
Antwerp 1769-1843 5.467 12.643
Augsburg 1769-1843 0.628 3.647
Gdansk 1769-1843 12.283 14.865
London 1769-1843 15.117 18.436
Madrid 1769-1843 0.769 6.692
Milano 1769-1843 5.091 6.783
Munich 1769-1843 2.322 1.213
Paris 1769-1843 0.822 5.143
Strasbourg 1769-1843 1.927 8.840
Vienna 1769-1843 1.794 12.035
Warsaw 1769-1843 0.854 10.494
Krakow 1844-1914 4.744 17.596
Munich 1844-1914 6.481 14.267
Paris 1844-1914 3.253 7.501
Warsaw 1844-1914 4.417 11.642
Table A88: Adjusted Half-life (Monthly), Wood
City Sample Half Life (European City) Half Life (Istanbul)
Augsburg 1691-1768 47.520 2.086
Gdansk 1691-1768 18.582 0.425
Madrid 1691-1768 1.090 0.139
NorthernItaly 1691-1768 4.986 0.147
Paris 1691-1768 2.469 0.265
Warsaw 1691-1768 1.572 0.254
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Figure A6: Average marginal effects of war on integration
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Marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals calculated for the PPML regression specification
used in column VII, Table 1.
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